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Abstract
Emergency locator transmitters are radio beacons that help locate aircraft in
distress and are required on many aircraft, primarily general aviation aircraft. The
purpose of an emergency locator transmitter is to assist SAR teams in rapidly locating
downed aircraft so aid can be provided to the pilot and passengers. The first emergency
locator transmitters, still in use today, were found to have crash activation rates of only
twenty-five percent (25 %). This means that three out of every four crashes are not
detected by these devices. Newer emergency locator transmitters were found to have
crash activation rates of seventy-three percent (73 %) to eighty-two percent (82 %),
leaving room for improvement.
In addition to emergency locator transmitter having a marginal crash detection
rate, emergency locator transmitters were found to have an appalling and inexcusable
false alarm rate. The false alarm rate of all emergency locator transmitters is greater than
ninety-four percent (94 %). Many explanations have been suggested for this high false
alarm rate including hard landings and inadvertently activating the emergency locator
transmitter during maintenance. This research project investigated the sensitivity of
emergency locator transmitters to these non-distress impact events.
This research project consisted of two (2) main tasks: creation of a database of
non-distress deceleration pulses and investigation of what types of non-distress events
cause activation. In creating a database of non-distress event data, a portable data
acquisition system was developed. There were also two (2) supplemental objectives:
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impact testing of the enhanced emergency locator transmitter and reverse engineering of
a 406-Megahertz emergency locator transmitter.
The database of non-distress impact events included landing pulses from a Cessna
152, normal operation vibrations from a Cessna 152, and impact pulses from an ELT
being dropped onto a hardened surface. Landing data and normal operation data were not
found to cause false alarms, while mishandling an ELT was found to be a cause of false
alarms.
Chapter 1 - Background and Introduction
Emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) are radio beacons that help locate downed
aircraft. ELTs are usually found in the tail section of airplanes and rely on a crash sensor
to monitor the acceleration experienced by the plane. When the sensor detects a crash,
the ELT transmits a distress call. Once the distress call is received, search and rescue
(SAR) teams can home in on the location of the ELT and provide aid to the passengers.
ELTs are required on many of today's aircraft, but this was not always the case.
In t he early to mid 1 960's, t here w ere several airplane accidents in which individuals
survived small airplane crashes only to perish waiting to be rescued. It was one of these
airplane accidents that motivated the United States Federal Government to require ELTs
in aircraft.
The Oien Family Aircraft Crash
On March 11, 1967, Mr. Alvin Oien was flying his Cessna 195, N9366A, from
Portland, Oregon to San Francisco, California [1] [2]. Onboard the airplane was Oien's
wife Phyllis and Carla Corbus, Oien's fifteen year old stepdaughter. While flying over
the Trinity Mountains in California, the aircraft's only engine lost power. Visibility was
poor owing to snow and the aircraft crashed into trees. The family survived the crash, but
all were injured. They would have to survive the elements as they waited for SAR teams
to locate them without the aid of an ELT.
After se veral days of b eing t rapped o n t he s ide of t he m ountain, M r. O ien, an
experienced outdoorsman, decided to hike through the snow-covered mountain in search
of help [2]. His family remained behind sheltering themselves in the Cessna. They had
to melt snow for water, sparingly consume what little food they brought with them for the
trip, and fight the bitter cold. Everyday aircraft could be heard flying overhead. To
occupy themselves, they played cards that they made from the airplane seats, and wrote a
diary in an Airman's guide. On April 30, 1967, Carla Corbus turned sixteen while being
stranded on the side of a mountain.
A hunter found the wrecked Cessna 195 in October of 1967, seven (7) months
after they disappeared [2]. There were no survivors. Alvin Oien perished in the
wilderness without reaching a major interstate that was only eight (8) miles from the
crash site. Also recovered was the diary which chronicled the Oien family's struggle for
survival. This diary is what would motivate Congress to create a law requiring ELTs.
The Early History of EL Ts
Emergency locator transmitters originated in the 1950's when the U.S. military
used them to notify Search and Rescue teams of downed aircraft [3]. The purpose of an
ELT is to help pinpoint the location of the crashed plane by transmitting a signal from the
crash location. It w as not until 1 963 that the Federal Aviation A dministration (FAA)
investigated the use of ELTs in civil aviation aircraft with a proof-of-concept study. The
result of this study was published in the FAA Advisory Circular 170-4 on January 9,
1964 and the FAA then solicited industry opinions on ELTs [3].
In 1967, several newspapers and magazines published articles on Oien family
tragedy. One such article caught the attention of Senator Peter Dominick. Senator
Dominick vigorously worked with Senator Warren Magnuson to pass a law to require
ELTs in aircraft [4]. While Senators Dominick and Magnuson worked on their bill, the
FAA released Advisory Circular 91-19 on March 17, 1969 advising pilots to install ELTs
[3].
The Radio Technical Committee for Aeronautics (RTCA) also began work on
ELTs. On November 15, 1970, the RTCA published three documents DO-145, DO-146,
and DO-147. These documents contained design parameters for an ELT's transmitter,
housing, crash sensor, and overall operation. The FAA adopted these guidelines as
Technical Standard Order (TSO) C91.
On December 29, 1970, President Richard Nixon signed into law the
Occupational Safety and Heath Act of 1970 [4]. Included as Section 31 of this law was
Senators Dominick and Magnuson's bill on ELTs. It stated that fixed-wing powered
aircraft must have an ELT installed on the aircraft [5]. This law only applied to aircraft
used for air commerce and excluded:
* Jet-powered aircraft
* Military aircraft
* Aircraft used in air transportation other than air taxis and charter aircraft
* Aircraft used for training within twenty miles from its base
* Aircraft used for the aerial application of chemicals.
This law amended Section 601(d) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Aircraft
that were in service had three (3) years to comply with the law, while newly
manufactured aircraft had one (1) year to install an ELT [3]. The FAA also added TSO-
C91 to the Federal Aviation Regulations, and required that ELTs used in aircraft would
have to meet the specifications developed by the RTCA.
The date for ELT compliance was December 30, 1973, but for two Congressmen
this proved to be too late. On October 16, 1972, House Majority Leader Hall Boggs Sr.
and Congressman Nick Begich had plans to fly from Anchorage, Alaska to Juneau,
Alaska with Boggs's administrative aide, Russel Brown [6]. They departed Anchorage at
8:59 AM on a Cessna 310C. At 9:09 pilot Don Jonz, Pan Alaska Airways chief pilot and
president, contacted the Anchorage Flight Service Station. He received the current
weather conditions and filed a flight plan under the Visual Flight Rules. This was the last
radio communication anyone ever had with this aircraft. The plane never reached Juneau
and an intensive thirty-nine (39) day search to find the missing crew began.
The search for the missing Cessna 310C was difficult. The Federal Aviation
Regulations (FAR) did not require the Cessna 310C to be equipped with an automatic
ELT. However, there was a newly instated Alaskan Law that required all aircraft that
flew within the state to have an ELT [6]. Pan Alaska Airways met this law by having
their pilots carry a portable ELT, an ELT that had to be manually activated for a distress
call to be transmitted.
Unfortunately, Jonz's personal ELT was found in another aircraft after the Cessna
310C was reported missing [6]. Visual searches by aircraft and ground crews were the
only way to find the Cessna 310C. Tragically, Don Jonz, Hale Boggs Sr., Nick Begich,
and Russel Brown were never found.
Due to this tragedy Congress wanted to shorten the time for ELT compliance,
however there were problems. The FAA received numerous reports of ELT false alarms
that subsequently wasted SAR resources. To stress the importance of this issue the FAA
released two Advisory Circulars in October of 1972. Advisory Circular 20-81 notified
aircraft owners of accidental activation of ELTs and their penalties. Advisory Circular
00-35 stated guidelines for "licensing, installing, maintaining, and testing of ELTs" [3].
However, false alarms continued and raised the concern that there were problems
inherent in the design of ELTs.
The FAA issued Airworthiness Directives to three (3) ELT manufacturers to
resolve the problems with their products, and required the inspection of 27,000 ELTs.
Many ELTs needed to be repaired by the manufacturers, which required aircraft to be
without ELTs for extended periods of time. To compensate for non-operational ELTs,
Public Law 93-239 extended the date for ELT compliance to June 30, 1974 [3].
The FAA performed an investigation into the reported problems with ELTs. One
of the more serious problems that they uncovered was that ELT mounting brackets were
inadequately designed. This resulted in ELTs detaching from the aircraft during a crash
causing the antenna wire to disconnect. Other findings of the investigation were that
there were battery and crash sensor failures. The crash sensor failure was investigated by
the RTCA, Special Committee 127 (SC 127). Their goal was to revise the Minimum
Performance Standards of RTCA DO-145 and DO-127.
When ELT problems persisted throughout 1975, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) began to collect information regarding ELTs during their accident
investigations. The Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) also began
collecting data on ELTs during their SAR missions. This resulted in the NTSB
recommending that the FAA require specifications to ensure ELTs would remain
attached to the plane during a crash, to require a battery test feature, and to provide that
ELTs activate under deceleration levels that are seen in actual accidents. The FAA
responded that there have been improvements with ELT breakaways, a battery test
feature would reduce ELT reliability, and the RTCA SC-127 was investigating problems
with the crash sensor [3].
At the same time, the FAA was conducting another Directed Safety Investigation
on false alarms and activation failure during a crash. T he results of t he investigation
were released in 1976 and stated that "batteries continued to fail because of corrosion,
leaks, short circuits, and expiration of shelf life; that crash sensors continued to fail
because of improper design, jamming, and corrosion; and that ELTs continued to fail
because of improper mounting, location, and short circuits" [3]. The report also stated
that 90 percent of the false alarms are from parked aircraft at airports.
Even though the FAA found that significant problems with ELTs still existed,
little progress was made in the following years. ELT false alarms continued to burden
Search and Rescue Centers. These false alarms have been known to mask the distress
call of downed aircraft in need of SAR assistance. The non-distress ELT signals must
first be silenced before the distress beacon can be located. Moreover, the AFRCC
estimated that the cost of search and rescue operations for false alarms exceeded
$800,000 in 1976 [3].
It was not until 1985 that TSO-C91 was revised. The new standard was TSO-C91
(a) and it addressed the problems found with ELTs governed by TSO-C91.
Improvements were made to the crash sensor, ELT mounting hardware, and battery
maintenance standards. The next significant step, taken in 1992, was the issue of TSO-
C126, an ELT standard with improved transmitter characteristics. The improvements of
TSO-C91 (a) and TSO-C126 are discussed later in this chapter.
Types of ELTs
Emergency locator transmitters can be divided into two categories: first
generation ELTs and second generation ELTs. The distinction between first generation
and second generation ELTs is based on the carrier frequency at which they transmit the
distress call. Both TSO-C91 and TSO-C91 (a) specify that ELTs transmit on carrier
frequencies of 121.5 Megahertz (MHz) and 243.0 MHz [7, 9]. ELTs that meet these
standards are known as first generation ELTs. Second generation ELTs meet the design
specification of TSO-C126, which specifies a carrier frequency of 406.025 MHz [8].
The RTCA recognizes four types of ELTs: automatic fixed (AF), automatic
portable (AP), survival (S), and automatic deployable (AD) [8, 9]. The goals of
automatic fixed, automatic portable and automatic deployable ELTs are to survive a
crash, detect the crash, and automatically transmit a distress call. Automatic fixed ELTs
are designed to be rigidly and permanently attached to the aircraft, and remain attached
after the crash has occurred. Automatic portable ELTs are designed to be removed from
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the aircraft after the crash and be tethered to a person or raft. Automatic deployable
ELTs are designed to automatically eject from the aircraft when a crash has occurred.
The goals of a survival ELT are to survive a crash and transmit a distress call when
manually activated. Survival ELTs do not have a crash sensor.
The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) dictate which aircraft must have an
ELT. According to FAR Section 91.207, there must be an approved automatic ELT
installed in U.S. registered civil aircraft which operate under:
* Part 121 - domestic, flag, and supplemental operations
* Part 125 - airplanes having a seating capacity of 20 or more passengers or
a maximum payload capacity of 6,000 pounds or more
* Part 135 - commuter and on-demand operations.
Aircraft that operate under these parts include single engine aircraft used for recreational
purposes, private aircraft used by businesses, and larger aircraft used for transport of
cargo and passengers.
U.S. registered civil aircraft that do not meet these operations must carry either an
approved portable or automatic ELT [10]. With a portable ELT a crash sensor is not
present a nd t he p ilot manually p erforms a ctivation. P aragraph 9 1.207 (e) o ft he F AR
permits aircraft that require an ELT to be flown without an ELT when one of the
following conditions applies:
* A newly acquired airplane may be flown to a place where the ELT will be
installed
* An airplane with an inoperable ELT can be flown to a location where the
ELT can be repaired or replaced [10].
There are some aircraft which operate under Parts 121, 125, and 135, but are
exempt from having an ELT installed. Section 91.207 (f) lists these exemptions:
* Aircraft engaged in scheduled flights by scheduled air carriers
* Aircraft engaged in training operations conducted within 50 nautical miles
from the airport where flight began
* Aircraft engaged in flight operations incident to design and testing,
* New aircraft engaged in flight operations incident to manufacture,
preparation, and delivery
* Aircraft engaged in flight operations incident to the aerial application of
chemicals and other substances for agricultural purposes
* Aircraft certificated by the Administrator for research and development
purposes
* Aircraft used for showing compliance with regulations, crew training,
exhibition, air racing, or market surveys [10].
This section also states that if an ELT has been removed from the aircraft for inspection,
repair, modification, or replacement, the aircraft may be flown provided:
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* The aircraft records contain an entry which includes the date of removal,
the make, model, serial number, and reason for removing the transmitter
* A placard is location in view of the pilot to show "ELT not installed"
* The aircraft cannot be operated more than 90 day after the ELT has
initially been removed [10].
On January 1, 2004 an exemption, stating that turbo-jet aircraft can operate without an
ELT, was removed from the FARs. This was a result of a 1996 Learjet crash that
occurred on Christmas Eve 1996 [11]. Despite some witnesses who saw a low flying
aircraft and others who heard the crash, the crash site was not found until November 11,
1999. ELTs are now required on these planes to expedite discovery of survivors of
downed turbojet aircraft.
Also, on January 1, 2004, aircraft that are used in air transportation which have a
maximum payload capacity of more than 18,000 pounds are exempt from having an ELT
onboard. Finally, TSO-C91 ELTs cannot be used in new installations after June 21,
1995. Any ELT installed after this date must meet TSO-C91 (a) or TSO-C126
regulations [10].
First Generation ELT's
First generation ELTs are those that meet the requirements set forth in TSO-C91
and TSO-C91 (a). Figure 1 shows a first generation ELT. First generation ELTs transmit
a distress signal on a carrier frequency of 121.5 MHz and 243 MHz, a civilian
communication channel and a military communication channel; respectively. The carrier
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signal is tone modulated by a downward sweep between 1,600 Hertz (Hz) and 300 Hertz
[9]. Distress calls are repeated every quarter second (4 Hz) to half second (2 Hz) and can
be detected by FAA facilities, general aviation aircraft, military aircraft, commercial
airliners, and ham. radio operators [9, 12]. Satellites can also detect these signals;
however, this is difficult since the signals have a low power output, between 25 and 50
milliwatts (mW).
It is estimated that 600,000 first generation distress beacons are in use worldwide,
and 270,000 of them are in use in the United States [13]. Typical notification times, i.e.
the time it takes for the signal to be received by a search and rescue group, are one (1) to
two (2) hours [16]. The initial search area for a first generation ELT is 500 square
nautical miles. Locating the downed aircraft can be accomplished visually by a flight
overhead the crash site or it can be accomplished on the ground using direction-finding
(DF) equipment. Searches for first generation ELTs usually take long periods of time.
The cost of first generation ELTs range between $400 and $1200. This price includes
accessories such as cabling, mounting hardware, antenna, and remote switch, but not
installation costs.
Figure 1. First Generation Emergency Locator Transmitter
Second Generation ELTs
Second generation ELTs are those that meet the requirements of TSO-C126. A
second generation ELT can be seen in Figure 2. Both TSO-C91 (a) and TSO-C126 have
identical case design and color specifications. Second generation ELTs transmit a
distress signal on a carrier frequency of 406.025 MHz (406 MHz) [8]. The carrier signal
is phase modulated by a digital signal, which repeats every 47.5 seconds to 52.5 seconds.
The distress call can contain a 112-bit short message or a 144-bit long message. A long
message is the same as a short message except it also contains latitude and longitude
information. The power output of a second generation ELT is 5 Watts. Distress calls
from second generation ELTs are received by satellites [8]. Details of the satellite
notification system are provided in more detail later in this chapter.
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Figure 2. Second Generation ELT
There are an estimated 225,000 TSO-C126 distress beacons used worldwide and
61,000 used in the U.S. [13]. Each TSO-C126 ELT must be registered, and has a unique
user identification. This information is transmitted in the distress call. The average
notification time for a second generation ELT is forty-five (45) minutes, but could be as
low as several minutes depending upon satellite coverage. The initial search area is
twenty-five (25) square nautical miles [16]. These ELTs can also have optional GPS that
significantly reduces the search area to within meters of the crash site. The cost of one of
these units is $1500, and with necessary antenna and accessories, it is not unusual for the
price to exceed $3000. This figure does not include installation costs.
Some ELT manufactures, such as Artex, offer a three-frequency ELT. This ELT
is exactly what its name implies, an ELT that transmits at 121.5 MHz, 243.0 MHz, and
406.0 MHz. These ELTs are in the same price range as second generation ELTs.
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ELT Satellite Detection
An international program known as COSPAS-SARSAT governs satellite
detection of ELTs. COSPAS stands for Cosmicheskaya Systema Poiska Aariynyick
Sudov which translates loosely into "Space Systems for the Search of Vessels in
Distress", while SARSAT stands for "Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking." [17]
The program began in 1979 as a cooperative program between USA, Canada, France, and
the then USSR. The objective was to develop a satellite-aided search and rescue system.
The first successful demonstration and evaluation of this system occurred in 1982. In
1985, the COSPAS-SARSAT satellite system was officially operational [18].
.An International COSPAS-SARSAT Programme Agreement was adopted in 1988
with the following goals [17]:
* Assure the long term operation of the COSPAS-SARSAT System
* Provide distress alert and location data on a non-discriminatory basis
* Support the objectives of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) concerning
search and rescue
* Define the means by which the COSPAS-SARSAT System is to be
managed.
Today there are thirty-five (35) participating countries, and two (2) participating
organizations.
An overview of the COSPAS-SARSAT satellite system can be seen in Figure 3.
Either a geostationary Earth orbiting satellite for search and rescue (GEOSAR) or a low
Earth orbiting satellite for search and rescue (LEOSAR) first detects a distress call. Next,
the message is transmitted to a local user terminal (LUT) that is GEOSAR specific or
LEOSAR specific. These ground stations are referred to as G EOLUTs or L EOLUTs.
LUTs relay the signal to a mission control center (MCC). The MCC processes the
distress call and alert a rescue coordination center (RCC) or SAR Points of Contact
(SPOC).
GEOSAR
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Figure 3. COSPAS -SARSAT System Overview [13]
As mentioned above there are two types of satellites: LEOSARs and GEOSARs.
LEOSAR satellites orbit the Earth in paths perpendicular to the equator called near pole
orbits. GEOSARs remain stationary with respect to the Earth surface and always monitor
the same area. These orbits can be seen in Figure 4. LEOSARs orbit at an altitude of
850 kilometers and GEOSARs orbit at an altitude of 36,000 kilometers. As of September
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2004, there were six (6) LEOSAR satellites in orbit, SARSAT-6, 7, 8, and 9, and
COSPAS-4 and 9. There were also five (5)g eostationary satellites in orbit, GOES-9,
GOES-East, GOES-West, INSAT 3A, and MSG [19].
Both LEOSAR and GEOSAR satellites can detect and store the digital message
(112-bit short or 144-bit long) of a 406 MHz ELT. The average time before a first alert is
issued with LEOSAR satellites is eighty-seven (87) minutes, while this time for
GEOSAR satellites is forty-three (43) minutes [18]. This is a result of LEOSAR
satellites having to wait on average forty-four (44) minutes until an appropriate LUT is
visible, while GEOLUTs are always visible to GEOSAR satellites and the distress call
can immediately be transmitted. It takes approximately forty (40) minutes to process
each signal and send out the first alert. Even though notification time is quicker with
GEOSAR satellites, position information is not guaranteed. There is no relative motion
between a downed aircraft and a GEOSAR; therefore, Doppler positioning techniques
cannot be used to determine the position of the crash. GEOSARs can only transmit
position data if position data is transmitted to it by the ELT. In contrast, LEOSAR
satellites do use Doppler positioning techniques to give SAR an estimated position of the
crash site.
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Figure 4. LEOSAR and GEOSAR Orbits [13]
LEOSAR Satellites can detect distress calls for 121.5/243 MHz ELTs, but
GEOSAR Satellites cannot. This is because first generation ELTs signals are not strong
enough to be detected by the higher altitude GEOSAR satellites. LEOSAR satellites can
use Doppler positioning techniques to transmit location information to a visible
LEOLUT. If there is not a visible LEOLUT, this information cannot be stored or relayed
later [18].
Problems with ELTs
ELTs are useful in detecting downed aircraft but have remained, for the most part,
unchanged for decades despite the release of new technologies. There are several critical
problems with ELTs that need to be addressed. These issues are:
* Termination of satellite coverage for 121.5/243 MHz ELTs
* Poor activation rate
* High false alarm rate.
Satellite Coverage Termination of 121.5/243 MHz ELTs
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) requested that COSPAS-
SARSAT terminate satellite detection of 121.5 MHz and 243 MHz signals citing that
satellites are receiving too many false alarms on these frequencies. The International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed to this request, and COSPAS-SARSAT
developed a Phase-Out Plan [21]. The outcome of the plan is that on February 1, 2009
there will be no satellite detection for first generation ELTs; less efficient methods will
need to be used to detect the distress calls from these ELTs.
If pilots want to be covered by SARSAT-COSPAS satellites, they will need to
upgrade to the TSO-C126 ELTs. However, pilots are reluctant to upgrade owing to the
significantly higher price of second generation ELTs.
Activation Rate of ELTs
The ELT activation rate is defined as how frequent an ELT transmits a distress
signal in the case of an actual crash. According to an Issue Brief by the Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association (AOPA), TSO-C91 ELTs had an activation rate of twenty-five
(25) percent in crashes [22]. The revised standard, TSO-C91 (a), improved upon this rate
considerably, yet is still only seventy-three (73) percent. Second generation ELTs have
the best activation rate at eighty-two (82) percent [22].
False Alarm Rate of ELTs
The false alarm rate is as the ratio of non-distress alerts to the total number of
alerts. There were three (3) sources used to analyze the false alarm rate of ELTs. The
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first source was SAR missions reported in the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center
(AFRCC) Annual Reports [24]. The second source was from the Front Range Electronic
Direction Finders (FREDF), a Search and Rescue group which responses to ELT alerts at
Northern Front Range of Colorado [25]. FREDF provides search reports for 1997 to
2003. FREDF search reports from 1999 were excluded because they are incomplete.
The third source is from a COSPAS-SARSAT information bulletin [23].
Before the false alarm rate of the current population of ELTs is calculated, the
false alarm rate of TSO-C91 ELTs was determined. The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) published a report in 1990 that found that TSO-C91 ELTs had a
false alarm rate of ninety-seven percent (97 %) [7]. This false alarm rate was calculated
by analyzing NTSB accident investigations from 1983 to 1987 and AFRCC annual
reports from 1984 to 1987. NASA also projected that the false alarm rate of TSO-C91
(a) ELTs would be twenty-five percent (25 %). The false alarm rate of the current
population of ELTs was calculated to determine if any improvements, to the false alarm
rate, were made in the past eighteen (18) years.
The AFRCC tracks SAR activity in the United States of America and is notified
of all detected transmissions from ELTs, Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons
(EPRIB) - used on maritime vessels - , and Personal Locator Beacons (PLB). All
detected transmissions are initially classified by the AFRCC as an incident. If the
incident can be confirmed as a non-distress event - contacting the owner of the beacon to
confirm an accidental activation or testing - then the AFRCC will close the case and it
will remain an incident. If a non-distress event cannot be confirmed, the AFRCC will
dispatch personnel and/or equipment. Incidents of this type are re-classified as missions.
Between 1999 and 2003, AFRCC had 37,305 incidents and 14,198 missions. Of
these missions, 12,377 (87 %) were searches for an ELT or EPIRB. The AFRCC does
not differentiate between ELTs and EPIRBs; therefore, the false alarm rate is for ELTs
and EPIRBs. Searches for distress beacons are further classified as ceased, distress, or
non-distress. The AFRCC defines a ceased signal as the termination of a signal before
the source was located, a distress signal as the signal from a crashed aircraft or sinking
ship, and a non-distress signal as a signal caused by a "malfunction, mishandling, battery
failure, accidental activation, hard landing, or a reason other than a crash." Figure 5
summarizes the five (5) years of AFRCC data.
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Figure 5. Summary of AFRCC ELT/EPIRB Missions (1999 - 2003)
According to the AFRCC Annual Reports, only 2.4% of the missions (299
missions) are actually searches for distress signals from emergency positioning beacons.
The number of ceased signals was found to be 33.7%. The false alarm rate was found to
be 63.8 %. This false alarm rate does not include false alarms that are associated with
incidents, which could increase the false alarm rate significantly.
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The AFRCC data does not isolate ELT missions from EPIRB missions; however,
the data from the FREDF only contains ELT related cases. The FREDF search reports
the date and time the signal was noticed, who received the signal, who investigated the
case, and whether the case was a distress or non-distress event. Figure 6 summarizes the
search reports. Out of the 191 signals received, 180 signals were non-distress alerts. The
false alarm rate is ninety-four percent (94 %). The quantity of non-distress events versus
distress events correlates well with the AFRCC findings.
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Figure 6. Summary of FREDF Search Reports
Next, the COSPAS-SARSAT Informational Bulletin was examined to determine
how many false alarms originate from 121.5/243 MHz beacons, and how many originate
from 406 MHz beacons. COSPAS-SARSAT computes two false alarm rates, the "SAR
false alert rate" and the "beacon false alert rate." The SAR false alert rate is the same
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aforementioned false alarm rate; the beacon false alert rate is the ratio of false alarms to
the beacon population. [23]. COSPAS-SARSAT reports that the SAR false alert rate is
ninety-eight percent (98 %) for 121.5/243 MHz ELTs and ninety-four percent (94 %) for
406 MHz ELTs.
Table 1 shows the COSPAS-SARSAT beacon false alert rate for 406 Mhz
EPIRBs, 406 MHz ELTs, 406 Mhz PLBs, and all types of 406 Mhz beacons. The all
types category includes data from the USA and other countries, while the individual
beacon false alarm rate contains data from outside the USA only. This chart shows that
beacon false alert rate is roughly ten percent (10 %) for ELTs, while EPIRBs and PLBs
are less than one percent (1 %).
Table 1. 406 MHz Beacon False Alert Rate [23]
EPRIBs ELTs PLBs All Types
(USA Not Included) (USA Not Included) (USA Not Included) (USA Included)
1999 2.7 % 15.1 % 0.0% 4.0%
2000 2.6 % 11.2% 0.8 % 2.8 %
2001 1.2% 9.8% 0.9% 2.8%
The COSPAS-SARSAT numbers above are only a beacon false alarm rate for 406
MHz beacons, because, according to COSPAS-SARSAT there is 'no accurate count of
the 121.5 MHz population.' However, in the 2004 COSPAS-SARSAT System Data
report, COSPAS-SARSAT estimates that there are 680,000 121.5 MHz and 341,000 406
MHz distress beacons used worldwide [22]. The Information Bulletin also states the
probable reason that the beacon false alert rate of 406 MHz ELTs is greater than other
beacon types is 'a reflection of the relative inexperience of aviation users with the
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operation of 406 MHz beacons.' It should be noted that EPIRBs and PLBs do not
contain a crash sensor, a common cause of accidental activations in ELTs.
Second generation ELTs do have a smaller impact on SAR resources because of
the unique identification given to each beacon. When a signal is received by a MCC, the
registered owner of the beacon can be contacted. If the signal is a false alarm, the owner
can verify the non-distress situation, and can reset the ELT, saving SAR resources.
The false alarm rate of TSO-C91 ELTs, according to NASA, was ninety-four
percent (94 %) and was predicted to decrease to twenty-five percent (25 %) with TSO-
C91 (a) ELTs. However, the improved TSO-C91 (a) and TSO-C126 ELTs did not lower
the false alarm rate of ELTs. COSPAS-SARSAT reports that TSO-C126 ELTs have the
same false alarm rate as TSO-C91 ELTs, while the combined false alarm rate for TSO-
C91 and TSO-C91 (a) ELTs are higher than the false alarm rate for just TSO-C91 ELTs
alone.
The ELT Crash Sensor
ELTs, unlike other emergency radio beacons, use a crash sensor to detect a
distress event. The activation of the sensor is governed by a crash activation sensor
response curve. We believe that these crash sensors, and subsequently the crash
activation response curve, are the primary reasons for the high false alarm rates. There
are many reported cases of ELTs being activated by being dropped onto floors,
mishandled during maintenance, and from hard landings [25]. Also, the crash sensors
can oxidize over time causing the sensor to fail. Both TSO-C91 (a) and TSO-C126 have
identical specifications for the crash sensor. Figure 7 is ac rash sensor from an ACK
Technologies E-01 ELT.
Figure 7. Ack Technologies TSO-C91 (a) Crash Sensor
The majority of current ELTs use these inertial switches to monitor crashes, while
one company, Serpe-Iesm uses a patented electronic G-switch in their KANNAD 406
ATP ELT. The crash sensor is classified as piezoelectric, most likely a piezoelectric
accelerometer. The cost of a traditional G-switch is $50.
ELT Crash Activation Requirements
TSO-C91 ELTs were designed to activate when deceleration in the longitudinal
axis of an aircraft reaches 5.0+2.0Gs with a pulse width of at least 11+5.0 milliseconds
[26]. Crash detection is accomplished with an inertial switch. Many NTSB crash reports
state that there were insufficient acceleration levels to activate TSO-C91 ELTs [7]. This
led to the development of the new crash detection requirements, which increased an ELTs
activation rate, but did not lessen the false alarm rate.
Both TSO-C91 (a) and TSO-C126 have identical crash activation requirement as
prescribed by the RTCA. TSO-C91 (a) ELTs follow the specifications of RCTA DO-
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183, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Emergency Locator Transmitters
[14]. TSO-C126 ELTs follow the specifications of RTCA DO-204, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for 406 MHz Emergency Locator Transmitters [15].
In these documents, the RTCA defined a crash as when the longitudinal axis of the
aircraft experienced a velocity change of-3.5±0.5 feet per second (fps), with a minimum
of deceleration of 2±0.3 Gs. The RTCA crash activation sensor response curve, as seen
in Figure 8, visually depicts when an ELT should activate..
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Figure 8. RTCA Crash Activation Sensor Response Curve
According to this chart, the ELT must activate above the 4.0 fps curve, and not
activate below 3.0 fps curve. There is a region between both of these curves when it is
acceptable for the ELT to activate or remain non-active. With increasing time of a crash
pulse, lower acceleration levels are required to activate an ELT. For crash pulses greater
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than 0.055 seconds, is limited by the acceleration threshold of 2±0.3 Gs. As the time
duration of a crash pulse decreases, higher acceleration levels are necessary to activate
the ELT. The RTCA Crash Activation Response Curve includes a 0.01 second cutoff on
the 4.0 fps curve. Therefore, for crash pulses with time durations of less than 0.01
second, there is no condition requiring the ELT to activate.
The RTCA crash definition is one-dimensional; deceleration is detected only
along the longitudinal axis of the aircraft. TSO-C91 (a) and TSO-C126 ELTs must
function properly when subjected to 30 Gs of lateral or vertical acceleration. There was
no such provision of TSO-C91 ELTs. One hypothesis is that current ELTs may be
inadvertently activated in a hard landing. This research program investigated this
possibility.
Several companies have developed E LTs that are marketed to the USA and to
European nations. The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) prepared regulations and Joint
Technical Standard Orders (JTSO) on ELT requirements for these European nations. The
JAA JTSO-2C126, which governs 406 MHz ELTs, adopted the European Organization
for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) d ocument 6 2. T his is s imilar t o t he F AA
TSO-C126 adopting the RTCA document DO-204. ELTs that met the specifications of
EUROCAE document 62 (ED-62) required a velocity change of -4.5 feet per second
(fps), with a minimum of deceleration of 2+0.1 G before the ELTs activates. ELTs that
used this version of a crash definition have been approved the FAA to be installed on
U.S. Civil Aircraft.
The Enhanced Emergency Locator Transmitter
The Enhanced Emergency Locator Transmitter (E2LT) developed by Rowan
University was designed to supplement existing Emergency Locator Transmitter systems
[27]. Unlike existing devices, the E2LT was designed to transmit the crash site location
and crash severity directly to Emergency Response Teams. The E2LT relies on an
advanced emergency location system that combines wireless communications and GPS
with a network of inexpensive sensors for crash detection. The purpose of the system is
not only to shorten the time it takes to for authorities to respond to the crash site, but to
improve the quality of the response.
The design of the E2LT is based upon the Automated Crash Notification System
developed by Rowan University. Several modifications were made to meet the demands
of the aviation environment. These modifications included power/system hardening, and
additional sensors for measuring impact severity along multiple axes. The objectives of
the E2LT were to:
* Improve crash location
* Improved crash detection
* Differentiate between hard landings and crashes
* Be scalable to large fleets
* Be inexpensive.
The E 2LT system i s c omposed o ft wo major s ubsystems: (1) t he Mobile Unit
which is installed onboard the aircraft, and (2) the Base Station which is responsible for
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receiving distress calls from the Mobile Units and reporting their location to emergency
response dispatch personnel.
Power
Figure 9. E LT System Architecture for Mobile Unit
Limitations of the E2LT
The features that make the E2LT special also limit the universality of its use. For
example, use of the cellular network to transmit messages depends on the availability of
cellular transmission towers, and hence can only be used in areas where such technology
is available. As a result, the E 2LT cannot be relied upon for emergencies taking place in
remote places, such as over water bodies. Additionally, GPS receivers are only useful if
the antenna can lock on to a sufficient number of GPS satellites. The functionality of
GPS in areas of dense foliage is hence uncertain..
Owing to these limitations, the E2LT is intended as an accessory to existing ELTs,
not as an independent system. Once installed, however, the E 2LT will greatly enhance
the existing system. It will automatically detect when a crash occurs. The system also
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possesses the ability to pinpoint the location of the crash using GPS. Additionally, the
E2LT can directly call the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) using CDPD or similar wireless
technology. Emergency personnel can directly receive the coordinates of the crash, and a
rescue team can be launched within a matter of minutes.
E2 LT Crash Data Recorder System Description
Rowan University has also developed a low-cost Crash Data Recorder (CDR).
The primary objective for development of a CDR was to provide a test bed for the core
functionality of the E2LT mobile unit. Successful devel6pment of the CDR has
demonstrated proper integration of the crash sensor, microcontroller, A/D, anti-aliasing
filter, external memory, power backup logic, and data acquisition software. The
development of a CDR also has the supplementary benefit that it may be used as a low-
cost standalone crash data recorder for enhanced accident investigation. A Crash Data
Recorder (CDR) has three major functions. The CDR must (1) detect a crash, (2) record
data from the crash, and (3) allow post-crash recovery of the crash pulse by accident
investigators.
Chapter 2 - Objective and Approach
Objective
The goal of this thesis was to investigate the sensitivity of aircraft emergency
locator transmitters to non-distress impact events. To reach this goal, there were two (2)
main tasks:
* Creation of a database of non-distress deceleration pulses
* Investigate what types of non-distress events cause ELT activation.
There were also two (2) supplemental objectives:
* Impact testing of the E2LT
* Reverse Engineering of a 406 MHz ELT.
Approach
Non-Distress Event Database
Hard landings are thought to be one reason for inadvertent ELT activation. Hard
landing data of aircraft was not readily available. This research effort has developed and
implemented a method to collect hard landing data. Our approach was to instrument a
general aviation aircraft with a custom-designed and built data acquisition system. This
system was used to record hard landing deceleration pulses during flight training lessons
given by Mercer County Community College, a local flight school. Data from other non-
distress events, such as dropping the ELT onto the ground, was also gathered by Rowan
University.
Investigate Causes of False ELT Activation
The database of non-distress event data was used to identify which events cause
false activation of ELTs. This was accomplished by comparing non-distress event
average acceleration and pulse width against the RTCA Crash Sensor Activation
Response Curve.
Impact Testing of the E2LT
In the future, the results of this thesis will be used to develop a crash detection
algorithm that will be integrated into the E2LT. Current ELTs have low activation rates
and high false alarm rates. The E2LT will have high activation rates with a low
occurrence of false alarms. Before a crash detection algorithm is developed, the E2LT
must meet all of its design objectives. To validate the E2LT, component tests of its
capability to accurately detect and record an acceleration pulse were conducted. Then the
E2LT was tested in a full-scale drop test. The full-scale drop test also determined the
E2LT crash survivability. The successful completion of these tests confirms the proper
operation of the E2LT.
Reverse Engineering of a 406 MHz ELT
The latest generation of ELTs transmits at 406 MHz as specified by TSO-C126.
When satellite coverage for the earlier TSO-C91 (a) ELTs expires in 2008, owners of
these older devices will cease to have prompt crash notification protection. Many aircraft
owners will not upgrade however owing to the cost of the 406 MHz ELTs. Moreover,
406 MHz ELTs are still fraught with poor activation rates and high false alarm rates.
Rowan University has purchased a 406 MHz ELT for disassembly and inspection. The
unit was disassembled to determine the sensor technology used, and to determine the
reason for the high cost.
Chapter 3 - Description of the Experiment
The goal of this experiment was to investigate the sensitivity of ELTs to non-
distress events. Non-distress events can be divided into three categories: normal
landings, hard landings, and other impacts. Normal landings are typical aircraft landings.
Hard landings are events where the aircraft experiences higher than typical deceleration
rates. Other impacts will include events such as accidental activation of an ELT due to
dropping it on a hard surface.
Unlike airplane crash test data, there is no database of non-distress data. The first
phase of these experiments was to collect normal landing data and hard landing data from
an instrumented aircraft. The second phase of this experiment was to collect other non-
distress deceleration pulses. From these experiments, the sensitivity of ELTs to non-
distress events was determined.
Approach
The approach was to instrument a general aviation aircraft and record deceleration
during landings for later analysis. Our strategy was to record the landings conducted by
student pilots who are more likely to subject the plane to hard landings than experienced
pilots. The Mercer County Community College (MCCC) Aviation Department approved
one of their aircraft to be used for these experiments [28]. The aircraft was a Cessna 152
trainer plane and was operated by a student pilot and an instructor. The method used to
collect deceleration pulses was to equip the Cessna 152 with accelerometers and a data
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acquisition system. All installation work performed by Rowan University was inspected
and approved for flight by MCCC and FAA certified aircraft technicians.
The MCCC flight school uses Cessna 152 airplanes in its training program for
beginner pilots. A photograph of one of their planes can be seen in Figure 10. Flight
instruction is given daily, conditions permitting. Each flight is approximately 1 hour in
length with 30 minutes of combined pre- and post- flight operations. Ideally, up to eight
landing pulses could be collected per day. During the actual tests, eight flights per day
were never realized due to scheduling, poor weather, and flight cancellations.
Figure 10. MCCC Cessna 152
In preliminary discussions with MCCC, Rowan University was able to negotiate
the following list of constraints for the data acquisition system, as well as examine the
aircraft [28]. The data acquisition system and sensors must:
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* Weigh less than 15 lbs.
* Be self-powered
* Be fully removable
* No screws/rivets would be used to attach the DAQ to the aircraft
* Pass flight safety requirements.
Design Considerations
Traditional data acquisition systems are robust, AC-powered, and heavy, while
the system for this experiment needed to be specialized, low power, and lightweight.
After inspecting the Cessna, and meeting with MCCC, it was discovered that on-board
power was not readily accessible in the tail of a Cessna 152. Access to on-plane power
would require an invasive rewiring of the plane, followed by FAA inspection. A
secondary problem was providing power to the data acquisition system between flights
when the aircraft was powered down and no electric power was available. Therefore, the
system needed its own internal power source.
The data acquisition system was installed in the luggage compartment directly
behind the pilot and co-pilot seats, and the accelerometers were mounted near the ELT in
the tail of the aircraft as shown in Figure 11.
DAQ Mounting
Figure 11. Instrumentation Mounting Location
Figure 12. Cessna 152 Luggage Compartment
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The system was secured to the airplane by using the luggage tie-downs onboard
the plane. Figure 12 shows the luggage compartment of the Cessna with the rear access
panel removed. There is a suitable mounting location for the accelerometers within an
inch of the ELT, as seen in Figure 13. The accelerometers were attached to the plane
with a semi-permanent surface insensitive epoxy, Loctite 454 Prism. The two bonded
parts could be easily separated by applying a shearing force. Any residual residue was
removed with Loctite 76820 X-NMS Clean-up Solvent.
Figure 13. Emergency Locator Transmitter on the Cessna 152
The first task was to decide whether to purchase or build a custom data
acquisition system. There are several non-traditional systems on the market that were
also investigated. The system that most closely fit our requirements was the
Instrumented Sensor Technologies EDR-3. This product is an event data recorder with a
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built-in triaxial piezoresistive accelerometer. However, this product has several
drawbacks. It has limited bandwidth, limited onboard memory, and would be difficult to
mount in the tail of the Cessna without modifying the aircraft. The EDR-3 also has a
base price of $8995, making it too expensive to justify a purchase of the system that is
not perfect for this application. By designing a custom data acquisition system, there was
more flexibility to tailor each aspect of the system to meet the research requirements.
Design of an Onboard Data Acquisition System
To begin the design process, a simple block diagram was developed containing all
the key components of the system. Figure 14 shows a simple block diagram of this
system. The components are a power supply, a processing unit, a data acquisition card,
signal conditioning, and sensors. Each of these components is described in the discussion
which follows.
Figure 14. Block Diagram of the Onboard Data Acquisition System
Power Supply
One of the constraints required a power supply to be installed in the Cessna 152 to
power the onboard DAQ. The power supply used was D-Cell Alkaline batteries.
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Power Processing DAQ Signal
Supply - Unit Card Conditioning Sensors
Compared with other alkaline batteries, D-cell batteries have the greatest power capacity
versus weight. Each D-Cell battery has a 1.5 Volt potential and a capacity of 18000
milliamp-hours [29]. The weight per D-cell is 5.03 oz. The final configuration of
batteries was determined based on the power requirements of the data acquisition system.
Processing Unit
The processing unit of the data acquisition system needed to be lightweight and
have low power requirements, while still being capable of being used in a data
acquisition system. A personal digital assistant, PDA, was chosen instead of a laptop
computer b ecause o f these c onstraints. T he P DA had to b e able to connect t o a data
acquisition card, which limited choices significantly.
A Hewlett-Packard iPAQ h5555 equipped with a PC Card Expansion Pack Plus
met these requirements and was purchased for the onboard DAQ. The iPAQ h5555 uses
the Microsoft® Windows® Mobile 2003 Premium for Pocket PC operating system, and
has an Intel® XScaleTM 400MHz processor, 128MB SDRAM, 48MB Flash ROM, and a
Secure Digital card slot. The SD card contains 256 MB of nonvolatile memory and was
used to store the landing pulses. The PC Card Expansion Pack Plus allowed the iPAQ to
connect to a PCMCIA card, and had a secondary battery. To power the system, six (6)
D-batteries were connected to a charger adapter. The charger adapter is designed to
power a Pocket PC with a DC power supply of nine (9) volts.
The processing unit must also be able to control the data acquisition card and
sensors. The software used for this function was National Instruments LabView Express
7.1 and LabView PDA module 7.1. This software package allowed a user to develop
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custom PDA applications that could be used for data acquisition. The development of the
program will be discussed in a later section.
Data Acquisition Card
The data acquisition card selected was the NI DAQCard-6036E. This card fits
into a PCMCIA slot and has a 16-bit digitizer capable of 200,000 samples per second.
The card can record up to 16 analog inputs. The National Instruments (NI) card was also
compatible with the LabView software, and allowed many built in features in LabView to
be used, which simplified code development. To connect accelerometers to the
DAQcard, a cable and a connection block was needed. These two parts were also
purchased from NI. The connection block contained the board where signal conditioning
was incorporated into the system. Another feature of the connection block was that it
could supply an output voltage to power the accelerometers if necessary.
Signal Conditioning
The purpose of signal conditioning is to ensure that the forces experienced by a
transducer are accurately detected and then accurately communicated to the user. Basic
signal conditioning requires that all wiring be shielded and that only one end of the
shielding be grounded to avoid ground loops, which cause noise. Transducers are
calibrated by their manufacturer and are supplied with a data sheet that has the transducer
sensitivity and power requirements. The data acquisition system needed to be configured
with these parameters.
Two other aspects of signal conditioning are nulling and pre-filtering. When a
sensor is supplied with power, there usually is an unwanted bias in the signal. Nulling is
the process in which the unwanted bias is removed from the signal. Pre-filtering serves
the purpose of removing unwanted noise, usually high frequencies, that could be
unreadable by the data acquisition system.
Nulling is performed when the transducer is in a quiescent state. Nulling can be
achieved by attaching a potentiometer to the transducer output and adjusting the signal
content until zero engineering units are read by the data acquisition system. This can be
performed manually, but is often done electronically. This operation is performed before
the signal is digitized by the DAQ system. Another way to remove an unwanted bias is
to programmatically offset the signal after it has been digitized. This latter technique was
used in the data acquisition system.
Pre-filtering purifies the signal by removing any noise from the signal before it is
digitized, while preserving the signal content the user is interested in. In most cases this
is performed by placing a low pass filter between the transducer and the A/D card.
Prefiltering also has the second purpose of preventing aliasing.
Aliasing is the condition that occurs when higher frequency content is interpreted
by the data acquisition system as a lower frequency signal. Figure 15 show the effect of
aliasing. Here a 10 Hz sine wave was sampled at 100 Hz and 12 Hz. The 10 Hz wave
was misrepresented as a 2 Hz sine wave when sampled at 12 Hz. Aliasing occurred
because not enough samples were taken to fully represent the original signal. To avoid
aliasing the sampling rate should be at least double the highest frequency that will be
sampled. This is known as the Nyquist criterion. Also depicted in Figure 15 is the 10 Hz
wave correctly represented by sampling at 100 Hz.
Time (sec.)
Figure 15. Signal Aliasing
Pre-filters are low-pass filters, usually of second order. An ideal low-pass filter
has a pass band, and stop band, and a frequency cut-off, fc. The band pass region
contains frequencies below the frequency cut-off. These frequencies are passed through
the filter unaltered. The band stop region contains frequencies above the frequency cut-
off. These frequencies do not pass through the filter. The third band, the transition band,
is the frequency range between the pass band and stop band where the frequencies are
attenuated. F igure 1 6 shows a simplified frequency response o fa low pass filter; t he
frequency cut-off is where the signal has been attenuated by 3dB and defines the
bandwidth of the pass band.
Frequency --
Figure 16. Generalized Frequency Response of a Low Pass Filter
Two common filters used for data acquisition are the Bessel and Butterworth
filters. Figure 17 shows the amplitude response of a 2 nd order Bessel low pass filter and
2 n d order Butterworth low pass filter. The Butterworth filter has a maximally flat response
in the band pass. The Bessel filter has a flat response within the band pass, but the
frequency attenuation begins earlier than with a Butterworth filter. When attenuation
begins with the Butterworth filter, it is steeper than a Bessel filter of the same order.
Frequency -.
Figure 17. Magnitude Response of a 2nd Order Bessel and Butterworth Low Pass
Filter
When a signal is filtered there is a time delay between when the signal enters the
filter and when the signal exits the filter. To preserve the shape of a signal, time delay
through the filter needs to be constant with regard to frequency in the pass band. For
instance, a one (1) Hz sine wave and a one-hundred (100) Hz sine wave must both be
delayed by two (2) seconds. The term given to this time delay through a filter is group
delay.
The group delay of a filter is determined by taking the derivative of the phase
iesponse of the filter with respect to frequency. The group delay of a 2 nd order Bessel
low pass filter and a 2 nd order Butterworth low pass filter can be seen in Figure 18.
Bessel filters have a constant delay for the majority of the pass band region, while the
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delay for a Butterworth filter increases as frequency increases in the pass band. The
Bessel filter will preserve the shape of a transient signal better than a Butterworth filter.
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Figure 18. Group Delay of a 2nd Order Bessel and Butterworth Low Pass Filter
The Bessel filter was used as the pre-filter since it has a constant group delay and
the signal shape will be preserved. However, in post analysis of the data, a digital
Butterworth filter could be used since the signal can be filtered in both forward time and
reverse time. Filtering in this manner is know as zero phase filtering, and preserves the
signal shape.
The circuit of the filter used the Sallen-Key topology. Figure 19 shows the
topology of a 2"d order Sallen-Key low pass filter. The filter consists of two (2) resistors,
two (2) capacitors, and one (1) operational amplifier. The operational amplifier used is a
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National Semiconductor LMC6482, CMOS Dual Rail-to-Rail Input and Output designed
to be used for active filters and data acquisition systems.
Vin Vout
Figure 19. Sallen-Key Active Filter
The governing equations for a second order Sallen-Key filter are [31]:
4b, aC 2 T- a 2C22 - 4bC 1C,
C2  Ca 2  1,2 4-C,C 2
Where,
C 1,2 = Capacitors
R1,2 = Resistors
Fc = Cutoff frequency
al, bl = Filter coefficients.
The filter coefficients for a second order Bessel filter are at = 1.3617 and
bi=0.618 [31]. Before the resistor and capacitor values were calculated, an appropriate
frequency cutoff needed to be selected.
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) J211-1 standard for impact testing
recommends that a channel frequency class (CFC) 1000 filter (1650 Hertz lowpass filter)
be used on all analog accelerometer signals. However, the onboard DAQ was limited to
a sampling rate of 2000 Hz and was not able to record with a CFC 1000 prefilter and meet
the Nyquist Criterion. To determine an acceptable frequency cut-off point, test data from
the FAA was analyzed.
The FAA performed a vertical drop test of a Shorts 3-30 aircraft [32].
Accelerometers mounted for the test were sampled at 10,000 samples per second and
prefiltered with a CFC600 (1000Hz) filter. Figure 20 shows the crash pulse. Figure 21
shows the frequency spectrum. The data used in this analysis was from an accelerometer
mounted to left-side wall seat track.
Time (sec)
Figure 20. Deceleration Crash Pulse from Drop Test of a Shorts 3-30 Aircraft
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Figure 21. Acceleration Frequency Spectrum of Shorts 3-30 Drop Test
The frequency response shows the highest magnitudes occurred below 100 Hz.
Above 100 Hz the magnitude increases slightly from 200 Hz to 400 Hz and magnitude
spikes are seen at 525 Hz, 700 Hz, and 850 Hz. The effect of the CFC600 prefilter can at
1200 Hz and signal content that existed above this frequency is unknown.
Figure 22 shows the Shorts 3-30 crash pulse filtered at 500 Hz with a low pass 2 nd
order Bessel filter and a high pass 2 nd order Bessel filter. The shape of the crash pulse
can be recognized by only examining the low frequency components of acceleration. The
low frequency components also contain the almost all of information regarding the
velocity change (delta V) of the aircraft as a whole. Numerically integrating the original
crash pulse returned a delta V of 19 feet per second. The lowpass filtered crash pulse
· _
also yielded a delta V of 19 feet per second. The high frequency components did not
yield any appreciable delta V (< 0.1 feet per second) of the aircraft as a whole and
represent local structural vibrations.
Time (sec)
Figure 22. Filtered Shorts 3-30 Crash Pulse
Limited by the DAQ and the Nyquist Criterion a cutoff frequency of 500 Hz was
selected. The sensitivity of ELTs above 500 Hz will not be examined in this research
project. Choosing a C1 of 22nf, the theoretical values of C2, R1, and R2 where calculated.
The closest actually resistor values to the theoretical values are: C2 = 33nf, RI, = 6.49k
ohms and R2=13.0k ohms. Now the DAQ was able to sample data according to the
Nyquist Criterion and avoid aliasing.
Sensors
The objective of this experiment was to record the deceleration versus time during
normal and hard landings. The crash sensors used in ELTs are linear damped
acceleration switches ('G' - switches). These switches must meet the activation criteria
described by the RTCA Crash Activation Curve. 'G'-switches have an open connection
below the 1.7 G curve, and have a closed connection above the 2.3 G curve. Between the
two curves, the connection can be open or closed. Figure 23 is a crash sensor from an
Ack Technologies TSO-C91 (a) ELT that has been cut to expose the internal mechanism.
The switch operates with a mass and a spring. To record a crash pulse G-switches could
not used. The accelerometer used would be one of the three following transducer types:
Piezoresistive, piezoelectric, or capacitive.
Figure 23. Cut away of a TSO-C91 (a) Crash Sensor
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Piezoresistive Accelerometers
Piezoresistive (PR) transducers are the standard type of transducer used in
automotive crash testing. The transducer is based on a Wheatstone bridge configuration.
Figure 24 show that this configuration consists of four (4) resistors connected end to end.
An excitation voltage is supplied to two opposing nodes of the bridge, and the
output is read from the two remaining nodes. If one or more of the resistors in the
Wheatstone bridge are replaced with strain gages, then the device is a full-bridge PR
transducer. Each strain gage is referred to as an active arm, while the resistors are
referred to as non-active arms. PR transducers must have at least one active arm, but can
have all four (4) elements of the bridge as active arms. If the transducer contains less
than four (4) elements, a completion circuit must be inserted to complete the Wheatstone
bridge before any operation can be performed on the signal.
v
Figure 24. Wheatstone Bridge
The strain gauge material used in accelerometers is typically silicon, and operates
on the piezoresistive effect, i.e. resistivity changes with strain [33]. The output voltage of
the transducer w ill b e 1 inearly proportional t o t he c hange i n resistance. P iezoresistive
accelerometers are supplied from the manufacturer with a sensitivity to convert the
acquired voltage signal to acceleration. This sensitivity is expressed in millivolts per G
(mV/G) and is dependent upon the excitation voltage. If the transducer is operated at a
different voltage, a different sensitivity must be used.
Piezoresistive accelerometers require a constant voltage source of approximately
10 Volts at 60 milliamps. Lower voltage PR accelerometers exist, but sacrifice
performance to operate on decreased power. Due to slight variations in each arm of the
transducer, there is a slight offset in the output voltage. As mentioned earlier, nulling is
used to balance the signal.
Accelerometers have a bandwidth that defines the range of frequencies they can
measure. A PR accelerometer can sense steady-state acceleration (0 Hz) and the upper
range of their bandwidth is typically several thousand Hertz. Certain models can have a
bandwidth of 200,000 Hz. Single axis PR accelerometers cost between $200 and $500,
while triaxial models can exceed $1,000.
Piezoelectric Accelerometers.
The next type of accelerometer investigated was piezoelectric (PE)
accelerometers [34]. PE accelerometers operate on the direct piezoelectric effect. The
direct piezoelectric effect states that a piezoelectric material will produce an electrical
charge when subjected to mechanical stresses. There are several ferroelectric ceramic
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materials that are piezoelectric. These materials are lead-zirconate-titanate (PZT), lead-
tinanate (PbTiO2), lead-zirconate (PbZrO3), and barium-titanate (BaTiO3). Quartz is
also a common material used in piezoelectric accelerometers. An ideal piezoelectric is
formed as a single crystal; however, ceramics are anisotropic. A process known as poling
is used to convert ceramics into isotropic materials to mimic the piezoelectric effect.
---
Figure 25. Piezoelectric Accelerometer
Figure 25 shows the operation of a piezoelectric accelerometer in a compression
mode. Piezoelectric accelerometers can also operate in flexural and shear modes [35].
Traditional piezoelectric transducers are high-impedance charge output devices. These
signals are extremely vulnerable to noise and require low noise cabling. The signal must
also be converted into a low-impedance voltage signal before it can be processed. In-line
charge converters or laboratory charge amplifiers located near the accelerometer will
eliminate this problem.
Some companies integrate electronics into the accelerometer housing which
convert the charge into a voltage signal. These transducers only require a two-conductor
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cable and are not as vulnerable to environmental noise. Accelerometers of this nature
require a low-current DC source, typically 18V to 30V at 2 milliamps [36].
Piezoelectric accelerometers are typically used to measure sound and vibration.
The typical bandwidth of PE accelerometers is from 1 Hz to 20,000 Hz. Thus, steady
state acceleration is not measurable by these accelerometers. The price of the
accelerometers is comparable to PR type accelerometers.
Capacitive Accelerometers
Capacitive accelerometers usually consist of a seismic mass, suspended by small
beams, sandwiched between two plates as shown in Figure 26. As the transducer
experiences acceleration, the capacitance between the mass and plates change. Most
transducers have onboard signal conditioning to convert the change in capacitance to a
voltage proportional to acceleration. Capacitive accelerometers can measure steady state
acceleration and can be purchased with a wide range of bandwidths, typically up to 1000
Hz, and cost between $500 and $1,000. Capacitive accelerometers have the same power
requirements as piezoresistive accelerometers.
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Figure 26. Capacitive Accelerometer
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One popular method of manufacturing accelerometers is with MEMs technology.
Two MEMs methods used are bulk micro-machined and surface micro-machined. Bulk-
machined capacitive accelerometers follow the design described above. Surface micro-
machined capacitive accelerometers operate on the same principles as bulk micro-
machined accelerometers, but use a comb structure, Figure 27.
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Figure 27. Surface Micro-machined Capacitive Accelerometer
Surface micro-machined capacitive accelerometers cost significantly less than
other capacitive accelerometers owing to the manufacturing process and come in standard
IC packages. These transducers can full-scale ranges of 100 Gs and bandwidths of 1000
Hz. Signal conditioning is built into the chip and power requirements are 5 V @ 3.5
milliamps. Surface micro-machined capacitive accelerometers are used frequently in
biomedical and automotive applications.
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Selection Parameters
Three (3) types of accelerometers were examined for bandwidth, full-scale range,
signal conditioning requirements, and power requirements. The initial list of constraints
was also used to assist in the selection process.
Frequency Response
The frequency response of a Shorts 3-30 aircraft was previously examined when
designing the prefilter. A 500 Hz low pass filter was selected. The bandwidth of the
accelerometers would not need to exceed this value. Also, it can be seen from the
frequency response of the Shorts 3-30 aircraft that frequency content extends down to
zero (0) Hz. The bandwidth for the accelerometer had to be from DC to 500 Hz. All but
PE accelerometers can capture acceleration within this range. PE accelerometers cannot
accurately capture signal content below approximately one (1) Hz.
Signal Conditioning Requirements
The next factor was signaling conditioning. All accelerometer channels were
prefiltered the signal and wired with shielded cable. With the addition of a constant
voltage power supply, this level of signal conditioning was satisfactory for full-bridge PR
accelerometers and capacitive accelerometers with onboard electronics to convert the
charge to a voltage. PE accelerometers require special cables and a constant current
source instead of a constant voltage source for power. The onboard DAQ was only
capable of reading a voltage signal so a charge converter would also be necessary for PE
accelerometers.
Power Requirements
Finally, power requirements were examined. PR accelerometers and some
capacitive accelerometers required the most power to operate. PE accelerometers used
very little power, but required a constant current source. Surface micro-machined
capacitive accelerometers required very little power, 5 Volts with a current draw of only
several milliamps.
Full-Scale Range
In the FAA test of an ATR42-300, the test used to validate the E2LT, the tail
section of an aircraft experienced 15 Gs. For the onboard DAQ, a reasonable full-scale
range was 20 Gs. All accelerometers investigated are capable of measuring this
magnitude.
Selection
Table 2 summarizes the accelerometer specifications. The best candidates for this
experiment were surface micro-machined capacitive accelerometers. The accelerometer
elected for this project was the ADXL250, a dual axis surface-machined capacitive
accelerometer supplied by Analog Devices. The ADXL250 has a full-scale range of 50
Gs, sensitivity of 38 mV/G, and a bandwidth of 1000 Hz. Steady-state acceleration is
measurable by the ADXL250. This accelerometer also uses very little power, 5 Volts at
3.5 milliamps and costs less than twenty (20) dollars.
Table 2. Accelerometer Comparison
Typical Specifications
Full-Scale Power
Type Bandwidth Range Requirements Cost
Piezoresistive 0-5,000 Hz <10,000 Gs 10V/60 mA $200 - $1,000
Piezoelectric 1 - 20,000 Hz < 2,000 Gs 20 V / 2 mA $200 - $1,000
Capactive
(Traditional) 0 - 1000 Hz < 500 Gs 10 V / 60 mA $500 - $1,000
Capactive
(Surface-MEMS) 0 -1000 Hz < 100 Gs 5 V/ 3 mA $5 - $50
Final Design
The constraints of onboard data acquisition required development of a light
weight, low power, customized data acquisition system. The final design of the data
acquisition system met these constraints and a block diagram can be seen in Figure 28.
The actual components can be seen in Figure 29.
All components of the DAQ system except for the accelerometers were stored in a
duffel bag. To protect the component in the duffel bag, padding was shaped around the
components, Figure 30. Figure 31 shows the DAQ system as it was installed onboard the
Cessna. The weight of the system, as installed on board an aircraft, was 11.4 pounds.
Figure 28. Block Diagram of On-Board Data Acquisition System
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Figure 29. Components of Onboard Data Acquisition System
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Figure 30. Onboard DAQ
Figure 31. Onboard DAQ complete
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PDA Software Development
National Instruments (NI) LabView is the graphical programming environment
used to produce a customized PDA application for the onboard data acquisition system.
LabView is capable of acquiring multiple channels of data a high sampling rates, making
a PDA feasible for the onboard data acquisition system.
This software package required that a program be written on a PC, compiled as a
Pocket PC executable file, and then uploaded to the PDA. Once the program was on the
PDA, it could be tested. If changes needed to be made to the program, the original PC
program was modified, recompiled for a PDA and uploaded to the PDA again.
The PDA application needed to acquire data continuously, analyze the data for a
trigger threshold, buffer pre-trigger data, and save pre-trigger and post-trigger data in the
event of an impact. Three (3) analog voltage output signals were sampled from two
ADXL250 accelerometers. The scan rate was experimentally found to be restricted to
2000 samples/second.
Onboard Data Acquisition System Validation
There were two objectives that needed to be verified before this system was
installed onboard the Cessna 152:
* Continuity of pre-trigger data and post trigger data
* Accuracy of recorded acceleration pulses.
The PDA application operated by passing an array of data samples.to a trigger
algorithm to determine if a threshold has been reached. If the threshold had not been
reached, another array of data was checked, while the previous array was saved in case
pre-trigger samples are required. Pre-trigger data from the previous array would be
useful only if no samples were lost between the two arrays.
Continuity Testing
The system reads and stores data samples in block of 2000 samples. Data was
stored using the trigger algorithm described above. To test that no data was lost in this
process, t he d ata acquisition sy stem w as c onnected t o an H P function g enerator. T he
PDA application was set for a trigger level of 3 Volts, and executed. The HP function
generator produced a sine wave of 10 Hz, and the voltage was manually increased until
the trigger threshold was achieved. The peak starting voltage of the sine wave was less
than 3 volt to ensure that arrays with pre-trigger data were saved. This test was
performed with an earlier version of the PDA application. In this application, some of
the pre-trigger data was truncated, and the pre-trigger data contained less than 2000
samples. This feature was removed in revisions of the program.
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Figure 32. Continuity Testing of PDA Application
Figure 32 shows the results from the continuity test. The manual increase in
voltage triggered the PDA and it saved the above data. The trigger data array contained
2000 samples, while 1502 pre-trigger samples were appended to the beginning of the
array from the pre-trigger data array. Analysis of the data revealed that no samples are
lost between data arrays. This proved that the DAQ Card was continuously acquiring
samples while the PDA application was analyzing data arrays.
Rowan Drop Tower Testing
The purpose of this test was to validate the PDA data acquisition system as a
whole by performing a series of drop tests in the Rowan University Drop Tower. The
PDA application was setup to record three (3) channels of data at 2000 Hz for one
second. The program used was an earlier version that was also used with the continuity
testing.
The same National Instruments SCXI system was used in these tests as used in the
previously discussed component tests. The SCXI system was programmed to acquire
three (3) channels of data at 5000 Hz. Two ADXL250 accelerometers were mounted to
an aluminum block and attached to the drop platform. The ADXL250 accelerometers
were oriented to record in the X, Y, and Z directions. Three (3) Endevco 2235
accelerometers were also attached to the aluminum block and oriented to record in the
same directions as the ADXL250's. Figure 33 shows the mounted accelerometers in the
experimental setup. The trigger level for both DAQ systems was set for 3 Gs.
Figure 33. Experimental Setup to Test Validity of Onboard DAQ
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Four tests were performed with impact severity ranging from 5 Gs to 14 Gs. The
results can be found in Appendix A. Each signal was run though a CFC60 filter, and
biased so the SCXI plot would overlay the PDA plot. The performance of the onboard
DAQ with ADXL250 sensors was compared with the laboratory DAQ with high
precision accelerometers in Figure 34, Figure 35, Figure 36, and Table 3. As can be seen
agreement is excellent.
Table 3. Summary of Validation Test Results
X, Peak Gs Y, Peak Gs Z, Peak Gs
Test ADXL250 Endevco ADXL250 Endevco ADXL250 Endevco
1 2.0 1.9 1.3 1.4 13.3 13.9
2 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 11.1 11.6
3 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 7.1 7.3
4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 5.6 5.8
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Figure 34. Validation Test 1, X Direction
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Figure 35. Validation Test 1, Y Direction
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Figure 36. Validation Test 1, Z Direction
Chapter 4 - Data Collection and Analysis
Introduction
This chapter describes the collection and analysis of the acceleration experienced
by ELTs in non-distress events. Non-distress events were defined in Chapter 4 as normal
landings, hard landings, and other events such as dropping the ELT onto the ground. To
collect normal and hard landing data the onboard DAQ was installed in a Cessna 152.
The DAQ was loaded with a custom LabView program that recorded the aircraft
deceleration upon landing. To collect data from other events, a separate parametric study
of ELT drop tests was conducted.
Determination of the Trigger Threshold
The onboard DAQ continuously monitors the acceleration of the aircraft. Data
are only saved when the acceleration exceeds a prescribed threshold. In order to set this
threshold, landing data from a Cessna 152 needed to be collected manually. To collect
the landing data the onboard DAQ was temporarily installed in a Cessna 152. The
LabView program was temporarily modified for this test. The trigger algorithm for the
LabView program was adjusted so that the user could manually trigger the program with
an onscreen control.
On September 13, 2004 the DAQ was temporarily installed in a Cessna 152 at the
MCCC flight school. The aircraft was flown by a pilot from the NJDOT Department of
Aviation. A member of the research team also flew on the aircraft to manually trigger the
DAQ upon landing. The DAQ was configured to record 3000 samples at a scan rate of
2000 Hz. A total of fifteen (15) files were saved from the flight. Out of these files, six
(6) were from landings while the other nine (9) files are from events such as taxing, take-
off, and flight. Table 4 summarizes the results of the flight.
Table 4. Overview of Data Recorded in Trigger Threshold Flight
File Time Activity
1 10:37:30 AM Stationary
2 10:38:49 AM Taxiing
3 10:44:34 AM Take-off
4 10:45:03 AM Flight
5 10:47:22 AM Flight
6 10:59:18 AM Landing
7 11:02:01 AM Flight
8 11:03:20 AM Landing
9 11:03:36 AM Flight
10 11:07:27 AM Landing
11 11:11:37 AM Landing
12 11:15:49 AM Landing
13 11:20:30 AM Flight
14 11:28:44 AM Landing
15 11:28:59 AM Taxiing
This data was analyzed for the peak deceleration of the Cessna 152 in the
longitudinal and vertical axis. The quiescent output for the longitudinal axis was 2.578
Volts (2.05 Gs) and the quiescent output for the vertical direction was 2.523 Volts (0.61
Gs). This offset was removed for the analysis. Figure 37 and Figure 38 show the peak
deceleration of a Cessna 152 in the longitudinal and vertical directions.
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Figure 37. Peak Deceleration of a Cessna 152 in the Longitudinal Direction
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Figure 38. Peak Deceleration of a Cessna 152 in the Vertical Direction
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With the exception of one data point from file 6 ("09132004 105918 AM.dat"),
there was a clear distinction between landing and non-landings in both the longitudinal
and vertical direction. The vertical direction shows better separation between landings
and non-landings and was the channel used for the trigger algorithm. The trigger level
was chosen to be 1.15 Gs. Taking into account the offset, 1.15Gs corresponds to a
2.5667 voltage output from the accelerometer.
As mentioned earlier, the nominal output of the vertical channel is 0.61 Gs. This
value is temperature dependent and may shift from day-to-day. A simple LabView PDA
program was developed to determine the quiescent output of the accelerometers and
calculate any adjustments that may need to be made to the trigger threshold value. This
value was entered into the automated DAQ LabView program. This program also
determined if the onboard DAQ was operating properly before the automated program
was run.
Installation of Onboard Data Acquisition System
Arrangements were made to install the DAQ system and sensors on November 8,
2004. T he D AQ w as installed i n a general aviation aircraft operated b y MCCC P ilot
Training facility located at the Mercer-Trenton Airport, and shown in Figure 39.
Figure 39. Mercer County Community College Pilot Training Facility
The DAQ was installed in a Cessna 152 registered as N31SD shown in Figure 40.
MCCC recommended the N31SD because it was used for pilot training, and was their
best candidate to experience hard landings. Just behind the pilot and passenger seats is a
luggage compartment as seen in Figure 41. The luggage compartment contains a cargo
net that will hold down part of the DAQ system.
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Figure 40. N31SD, Cessna 152 General Aviation Aircraft
Figure 41. N31SD, Luggage Compartment
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Figure 42. N31SD Emergency Locator Transmitter
Behind the luggage compartment is the tail of the aircraft and ELT, accessible by
removing a plastic panel. The accelerometers were mounted onto a bracket securing the
ELT to the aircraft. The ELT of the N31SD and mounting location for the
accelerometers can be seen in Figure 42.
The two (2) ADXL250 accelerometers were bolted to an aluminum block with
strain relief that was attached to the ELT mounting bracket. The sensor package was
attached with Loctite Prism 454, a semi-permanent epoxy. Figure 43 and Figure 44 show
the sensor package as installed in the aircraft, while Figure 45 shows the DAQ System
installed into the aircraft luggage compartment.
76
Figure 43. N31SD, ADXL250 Accelerometer Installed, Side View
Figure 44. N31SD, ADXL250 Accelerometers Installed, Front View
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Figure 45. DAQ System installed in N31SD
Data Collection
Non-distress Event Data
There were a total of eight (8) days that the researcher traveled to MCCC flight
school to setup the onboard DAQ system. The process each day included the following
tasks:
* Install six (6) D-Cell batteries
* Power on the PDA
* Open and execute trigger program
* Open DAQ program, input trigger value, and execute program
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* Collect files from the secure digital card, power down the PDA, and
remove the batteries.
Unfortunately, there were several problems encountered which needed to be
addressed before any landing data was collected. The first problem encountered was that
the input voltage from the ADXL-250 was constant at 5 volts. The problem was found to
be with the shielded cable used to connect the terminal block to the DAQ Card. This
cable was replaced with an equivalent unshielded cable from National Instruments.
The next problem encountered was that the trigger level, even though calculated
from data collected from a Cessna 152, was too low. Upon starting engine of the N31SD,
the vibration of the plane was greater than the trigger value, and the PDA continuously
collected d ata. T he higher accelerations were experienced because t he accelerometers
were installed aft of the accelerometers used in the threshold test. More importantly, the
mounting location of the accelerometers was not as rigid as in the threshold test. Owing
to the lack of rigidity, local structural vibrations of greater magnitude than landings were
triggering the DAQ. The acceleration in the vertical axis of the N31SD during normal
operation can be seen in Figure 46.
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Figure 46. N31SD Normal Acceleration, Vertical Axis
The acceleration in the vertical direction consistently peaked above the 1.75 Gs
threshold. In subsequent days of testing, the trigger threshold was set to higher values in
order to prevent continual triggering. However, in performing this action, there was a
risk of missing landings since the peak acceleration during a landing is within the same
range of the normal plane vibrations.
Another problem was that the SD Card could not store as many files as originally
believed possible. The SD card has a memory capacity of 256 MB, enough memory to
record over 6000 files from the onboard DAQ. However, it was noticed that the SD
digital card only contained 167 files, using 7 MB of file storage. The problem was with
the file architecture of the SD Card. Only 167 files could be saved in main directory,
while if the files were saved in a folder in the main directory thousand of files could be
saved.
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Out of the eight (8) days of testing, only three (3) files could be identified as
landings. Table 5 summarizes the outcome of the eight (8) day of testing as well as the
day of manual data collection. There are a total of nine (9) landings to compare against
the RTCA Crash activation curve.
Table 5. Summary of Cessna 152 Data Collection
Date Total Files Number of Trigger value Trigger Value
Collected landings (Volts) (Gs)
9/13/2004 17 6 N/A N/A
11/10/2004 22 0 2.566 1.74
11/15/2004 167 0 2.566 1.74
11/16/2004 0 0 2.566 1.74
11/18/2004 0 0 2.600 2.63
11/22/2004 167 0 2.590 2.37
11/23/2004 57 3 2.640 3.68
11/29/2004 36 0 2.640 3.68
12/14/2004 78 0 2.640 3.68
ELT Drop Testing Data
As mention in the first chapter, there are reports of ELT false alarms resulting
from the mishandling of an ELT. To investigate the validity of these reports, an ELT was
retrofitted with a laboratory grade accelerometer and dropped onto a rigid surface. The
ELT used was an Ack Technologies first generation ELT purchased by Rowan
University. T he accelerometer u sed w as an E ndevco 2 262A-200. F igure 4 7 shows a
break away view of the ELT before and after being retrofitted. All of the electronics
inside the ELT were replaced with an aluminum plate and accelerometer. Eight (8) D-
Cell batteries were installed in the ELT to obtain the correct weight.
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Figure 47. ELT retrofitted with a Laboratory Grade Accelerometer
A parametric study was performed to identify when the ELT would activate. The
parameters that were varied included the ELT drop height, and the side on which impact
occurred. The ELT was dropped from heights of 3 inches, 6 inches, and 12 inches and
impacted on its front face, side face, and rear face, as tabulated in Table 12. Additional
tests were also performed to mimic an ELT being knocked of a table. The same National
Instruments data acquisition system used in validating the Crash Data Recorder was used
in this experiment. The sampling rate was set to 5000 samples per second and a 1000
Hertz pre-filter was used. The summary of this test and results will be presented later in
this chapter.
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Data Analysis
A custom LabView program was created to analyze the data collected,by the
onboard DAQ and the data from the ELT drop tests. The user has the option of
performing the following options:
* Converting the ADXL-250 voltage output to acceleration
* Nulling all channels
* Filtering all channels
* Analyzing pulse width, peak acceleration, velocity change, and average
acceleration
* Saving the data as an ASCII file or in a MS-EXCEL file with charts.
The RTCA crash activation is governed by two parameters:
* A minimum velocity change of 3.5 fps +- 0.5 fps
* An acceleration threshold of 2.0, +- 0.3 Gs.
In analysis of the data, a crash pulse was selected and then integrated to find the velocity
change. Next the average acceleration of the acceleration pulse was determined by
dividing the change in velocity by the pulse width.
_Av 1
av At 32.174
To determine if a landing pulse can trigger the ELT to activate, average acceleration and
pulse width of the landing was plotted on the RTCA crash activation curve.
Non-Distress Event Data
There were nine (9) landings collected with the onboard data acquisition system.
Each file recorded by the DAQ contains three rows of data of 2001 samples, and each
row represents acceleration in either the vertical, longitudinal, or lateral axis of the
aircraft. The Data Analysis LabView program was used to gather the pulse width,
maximum acceleration, decrease in velocity, and average acceleration of the landings.
Some of the files were filtered with a 4-pole Butterworth filter at 30 Hz to help resolve
the landing pulse; most files did not need to be filtered. The filtering of the data did not
significantly decrease the value of average acceleration and velocity change. Table 6,
Table 7, and Table 8 summarize the analysis of the landing data for the lateral,
longitudinal, and vertical axis of the aircraft respectively.
Table 6. Summary of Landing Data, Lateral
File Filtered At Gmax Av Gaverage
(s) (fps)
8 Yes 0.1860 0.578 0.072 0.012
9 Yes 0.3946 0.293 0.395 0.068
13 Yes 0.2800 2.633 0.056 0.006
14 Yes 0.3270 0.950 0.098 0.009
388 No 0.1360 5.723 0.103 0.023
428 No 0.4055 4.831 0.710 0.054
Table 7. Summary of Landing Data, Longitudinal
File Filtered At Gmax Av Gaverage
(s) (fps)
8 Yes 0.1050 0.356 0.448 0.132
9 No 0.0990 1.438 0.745 0.234
12 Yes 0.0820 0.435 0.582 0.220
12 Yes 0.0750 0.407 0.653 0.270
13 Yes 0.0945 1.579 1.465 0.481
14 Yes 0.1155 0.284 0.464 0.125
14 Yes 0.0715 0.690 0.828 0.360
16 Yes 0.1820 0.442 0.833 0.142
16 Yes 0.0805 0.633 0.634 0.245
388 No 0.0775 2.125 0.660 0.264
408 No 0.0675 0.614 0.485 0.223
408 No 0.1610 0.726 0.631 0.128
428 No 0.0950 0.872 0.745 0.243
428 No 0.0185 1.835 0.550 0.923
Table 8. Summary of Landing Data, Vertical
File Filtered At Gmax Av Gaverage
(s) (fps)
8 Yes 0.3310 1.064 5.299 0.497
10 No 0.2345 1.287 2.859 0.379
12 No 0.2330 1.352 3.305 0.441
13 Yes 0.2115 2.938 3.665 0.538
14 Yes 0.2610 0.908 3.161 0.376
16 Yes 0.1555 1.045 1.641 0.328
338 No 0.1445 4.233 3.049 0.655
408 No 0.2790 3.689 7.187 0.800
428 No 0.2685 4.909 8.220 0.951
Table 6, the summary of landing data in the lateral direction, only contains six (6)
deceleration pulses from landing even though there were nine (9) landings. The reason is
that the LabView program was developed to examine acceleration in the positive
direction, which corresponded to aircraft deceleration in the longitudinal and vertical
directions. In three (3) of the cases, the landing pulse in the lateral axis was primarily in
the negative direction. These three (3) cases have similar pulses to the other six pulses in
the lateral direction and were not analyzed.
Table 7, the summary of the landing data in the longitudinal direction of the
aircraft shows more than one deceleration pulse presented per file. For some of the
landings, the saved acceleration file showed a distinct impact when rear tires touch the
ground and a second distinct impact when the front tire touches the ground. This is the
reason why there are more data points from landings than landings themselves in the
longitudinal axis. In general, the width of a landing pulse was greater than 100
milliseconds.
The onboard DAQ also recorded the vibrations of the Cessna 152 during normal
operation. In reviewing this data, several instances of high accelerations were noticed.
These acceleration were also analyzed in the same manner as the landing data. In general
the width of a pulse found in this data was less than 10 milliseconds. This data was also
plotted onto the RTCA crash activation curve. Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11
summarize the analysis of the normal operational data for the lateral, longitudinal, and
vertical axis of the aircraft respectively.
Table 9. Summary of Normal Operational Data, Lateral
File Filtered
8
13
14
16
82
85
86
87
121
122
208
209
210
374
388
388
429
At
(s)
0.0075
0.0095
0.0160
0.0085
0.0035
0.0040
0.0185
0.0045
0.0030
0.0040
0.0035
0.0030
0.0060
0.0100
0.0185
0.0275
0.0035
Gmax
2.169
6.891
2.4
2.208
2.004
1.948
4.041
2.232
1.963
1.062
2.168
1.271
4.211
3.617
2.645
3.284
10.083
Av
(fps)
0.338
1.112
0.484
0.282
0.134
0.157
0.875
0.164
1.178
0.071
0.139
0.058
0.383
0.579
0.932
1.271
0.733
Gaverage
1.398
3.635
0.940
1.029
1.187
1.216
1.470
1.134
1.178
0.549
1.237
0.595
1.980
1.798
1.564
1.435
6.504
Table 10. Summary of Normal Operational Data, Longitudinal
File Filtered
8
10
12
13
14
16
82
85
86
87
121
122
208
209
210
210
374
616
388
388
428
429
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
At
(s)
0.0125
0.0075
0.0120
0.0130
0.0120
0.0125
0.0030
0.0035
0.0080
0.0075
0.0040
0.0040
0.0035
0.0030
0.0030
0.0120
0.0040
0.0075
0.0325
0.0165
0.0065
0.0040
Gmax Gaverage
1.951
1.438
2.590
4.845
2.142
3.260
0.758
0.382
1.182
0.622
0.723
0.709
0.690
0.477
1.487
0.724
1.256
1.631
1.251
2.125
2.691
3.873
Av
(fps)
0.503
0.173
0.413
1.004
0.436
0.459
0.034
0.027
0.139
0.065
0.036
0.027
0.048
0.016
0.055
0.117
0.097
0.218
0.545
0.382
0.196
0.181
1.250
0.717
1.068
2.398
1.128
1.140
0.349
0.237
0.541
0.271
0.282
0.212
0.428
0.170
0.564
0.303
0.755
0.904
0.521
0.720
0.937
1.404
Table 11. Summary of Normal Operational Data, Longitudinal
File Filtered
8
10
12
13
14
16
82
85
86
87
121
122
208
208
209
210
374
375
387
388
388
388
408
408
428
428
429
429
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
At
(s)
0.0180
0.0265
0.0210
0.0210
0.0195
0.0290
0.0060
0.0045
0.0060
0.0050
0.0050
0.0035
0.0040
0.0165
0.0050
0.0060
0.0055
0.0195
0.0060
0.0090
0.0205
0.0175
0.0620
0.0945
0.0090
0.0095
0.0120
0.0085
Gmax
2.658
1.287
2.010
4.095
2.469
1.407
1.570
2.876
3.052
2.046
2.040
2.458
3.425
1.477
1.695
3.132
3.652
1.031
2.311
2.510
2.338
4.233
1.763
2.718
3.633
3.791
6.282
7.295
As can be seen in the tables, several files that have been used are the same files
that captured landings. However there were oscillations contained in these landing pulse
widths. In this set of files, oscillations were only examined instead of the complete
landing to see if one of these small duration events could activate an ELT. In general, the
width of a pulse found in the normal operational data was less than 10 milliseconds.
Av
(fps)
0.854
0.640
0.790
1.579
0.875
0.727
0.130
0.216
0.337
0.212
0.181
0.152
0.317
0.314
0.166
0.356
0.299
0.202
0.164
0.370
0.978
1.179
1.615
2.959
0.485
0.607
1.212
0.970
Gaverage
1.474
0.750
1.168
2.335
1.393
0.779
0.672
1.493
1.742
1.315
1.242
1.345
2.458
0.590
1.032
1.843
1.686
0.330
0.849
1.276
1.481
2.092
0.809
0.972
1.673
1.983
3.136
3.543
Figure 48, Figure 49, and Figure 50 overlay the results obtained from the onboard
data acquisition system with the RTCA crash activation curve for the lateral, longitudinal,
and vertical axis of a Cessna 152 respectively. Even though the RTCA crash activation
curve was developed for use with deceleration in the longitudinal axis of an aircraft, it
was used in the lateral and vertical plots as a reference.
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Figure 48. Lateral Acceleration
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Figure 49. Longitudinal Acceleration
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Figure 50. Vertical Acceleration
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These figures plot the average acceleration versus pulse width. On each figure,
two sets of data are plotted, landing data represented by circles and normal operation data
represented by asterisks. The quantity of landing pulses used in the lateral axis is six (6),
in the longitudinal (13), and in the vertical is fifteen (15). The data from the landings did
not cause an impact severe enough to trigger the ELT. The maximum average
deceleration in the longitudinal axis due to landing was only 0.48 Gs. The deceleration in
the lateral and vertical axis also did not exceed the limits of the RTCA crash activation
curve.
ELT Drop Test Data
A total of twenty-seven (27) tests were performed in this parametric study. The
data was analyzed using the data analysis LabView program. All of the acceleration
pulses were filtered with a 4-pole Butterworth filter at 100 Hertz. Table 12 summarizes
the results of the parametric study, and Figure 51 plots the results onto the RTCA Crash
Activation Curve.
Table 12. Summary of ELT Drop Test Results
Trail Height Impact Velocity Impact ELT
[in] [fps] Face Activation
1 3 4.0 front Yes
2 3 4.0 side No
3 3 4.0 side No
4 3 4.0 side No
5 3 4.0 rear No
6 3 4.0 rear No
7 3 4.0 rear No
8 6 5.7 front Yes
9 6 5.7 front Yes
10 6 5.7 front Yes
11 6 5.7 side No
12 6 5.7 side No
13 6 5.7 side Possible
14 6 5.7 rear No
15 6 5.7 rear No
16 6 5.7 rear No
17 12 8.0 front Yes
18 12 8.0 front Yes
19 12 8.0 front Yes
20 12 8.0 side Possible
21 12 8.0 side Yes
22 12 8.0 side Possible
23 12 8.0 rear No
24 12 8.0 rear No
25 12 8.0 rear No
26 29 12.5 N/A Yes
27 29 12.5 N/A Yes
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
Pulse Width(sec)
Figure 51. ELT Drop Test Results
Out of the twenty-seven (27) drop tests performed, the ELT would have activated
in ten (10) of the drop tests. The ELT would not have activated in fourteen (14) of the
drop tests. The results of three (3) of the tests lie within the 3.0 fps and 4.0 fps curves.
This means that activation was possible, but not definite.
Activation occurred in all instances when the ELT impacted the surface on its
front face. Activation did not occur in any of the drop tests where the ELT impacted on
its rear face. In the case of impact on the ELT's side face, false activation is possible at
heights greater than six (6) inches. This study also shows that if an ELT is accidentally
pushed off a table, the ELT can activate causing a false alarm.
Chapter 5 - Conclusions
ELTs are radio beacons that help locate aircraft in distress and are required on
many aircraft, primarily general aviation aircraft. The purpose of an ELT is to assist
SAR teams in rapidly locating downed aircraft so aid can be provided to the pilot and
passengers. Studies conducted by the NTSB, FAA, NASA, RTCA, and COSPAS-
SARSAT found several problems with all ELTs. Table 13 highlights some these
problems.
Table 13. Summary of ELT Problems
Activation Notification Time False
Type Rate & Search Area Cost Alarm Rate
TSO-C91(2. M 25% Poor* Low 97%(121.5/243MHz)
TSO-C91a(121 ) 73% Poor * Low 98% **(121.5/243MHz)
TSO-C126T 26 82% Good High 94%(406Mhz)
* Satellite Coverage Termination in 2009
** Includes TSO-C91 ELTs
TSO-C91 (a) and TSO-C126 ELTs have enhanced some aspects of TSO-C91
ELTs; however, they have failed to improved upon the false alarm rate. Many
explanations have been suggested for this high false alarm rate including hard landings
and inadvertently activating the ELT during maintenance. This research project
investigated the sensitivity of ELTs to these non-distress impact events.
A database of non-distress event data was created. This database includes landing
pulses from a Cessna 152, normal operation vibrations from a Cessna 152, and impact
pulses from an ELT being dropped onto a hardened surface. The longitudinal
deceleration pulses were analyzed to determine if the E LT would have activated from
these non-distress events.
Landing data and normal operation data were not found to cause false alarms.
The average acceleration in the longitudinal direction of the aircraft owing to landings is
< 1G with pulse widths of 60 - 200 milliseconds. The average acceleration in the
longitudinal direction of the aircraft owing to normal operation is < 2G with pulse widths
of 1 - 20 milliseconds.
Mishandling an ELT was found to be a c ause of false alarms. Out of twenty-
seven tests, activation occurred in all instances when the ELT impacted the surface on its
front face. Activation did not occur in any of the drop tests where the ELT impacted on
its rear face. In the cases of impact on the ELT's side face, false activation is possible at
heights greater than six (6) inches. This study also showed that a false alarm is possible
if an ELT is accidentally pushed off a table. Average accelerations in this study reached
35 Gs with pulse widths of 5 - 50 milliseconds. These results illustrate that care must be
taken when handling ELTs. In case of an accidental activation, the ELT should be
immediately disarmed to prevent wasting SAR resources.
In a previous project, Rowan University developed an Enhanced ELT (E2LT) that
has the potential to avoid many of these problems. The results of this research project
will be used to develop an advanced crash detection algorithm for the E2LT.
Recommendations for developing an advanced crash detection algorithm are:
* Create a database of crash pulses
* Expand database of landing pulses
* Expand database of non-distress impacts.
Aircraft crash data is available from the FAA and NASA. The onboard DAQ can be used
to collect more landing data; however, the accelerometers should be mounted to a rigid
structure of the aircraft to prevent triggering from local structural vibrations.
Deceleration data from abrupt aircraft stops can also be collected with the onboard DAQ.
The database of non-distress events can be expanded by performing additional laboratory
tests.
In developing an enhanced crash detection algorithm, it is essential that the
algorithm can distinguish between an aircraft crash and non-distress events. The
algorithms used in current ELTs, the crash activation curves, are not satisfactory for this
task. The databases of distress data and of non-distress data should be the starting point
for the development of an enhanced crash detection algorithm. Parameters that should be
investigated to differentiate between distress and non-distress events are, but not limited
to:
* Velocity change
* Peak deceleration
* Average deceleration
* Frequency content.
The first iteration of the crash detection algorithm used in the E2LT will have a
gray area between distress and non-distress events. False alarms will still be possible.
However, the E2LT, unlike existing ELTs, will record the deceleration pulse that causes
activation. In the case of a false alarm, the deceleration pulse can be recovered and the
algorithm can be refined to reduce the gray area between distress and non-distress events.
The ability to collect deceleration pulses can also lead to the development of aircraft
specific crash algorithms, instead of having one generic crash algorithm that encompasses
all aircraft.
Chapter 6 - References
1. "NTSB Probable Cause Report: OAK68A0032," [Online document], [cited 2005
March 1], Available HTTP: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=21022
2. Death in Trinity Mountains Time, vol. 90, no. 15, October 13. 1967.
3. NTSB, Bureau of Plans and Programs, Emergency Locator Transmitters - An
Overview. Washington, D.C. January 26, 1978.
4. Civil Air Patrol, A Short History of Emergency Locator Transmitters, Civil Air Patrol
News, October 2005, Available HTTP:
http://www.iawg.cap.gov/dsm/beaconstory.htm
5. Public Law 91-596, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Section 31.
December 29, 1970. Available HTTP:
http://www.labtrain.noaa.gov/osha600/refer/menu01b.pdf
6. National Transportation Safety Board, Bureau of Aviation Safety, Pan Alaska
Airways, Ltd., Cessna 310C, N1812H, Missing Between Anchorage and Juneau,
Alaska, October 16, 1972., Washington, D.C. January 31, 1973.
7. Dreibelbis, Ryland R., and Trudell, Brenard J., NASA Contract Report 4330, Current
Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) Deficiencies and Potential Improvements
Utilizing TSO-C91 (a) ELTs, Springfield, VA. October 1990.
8. Minimum Operational Performance Standards 406 MHz Emergency Locator
Transmitters (ELT), RTCA DO-204.
9. Radio Technical Communication Association, Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for Emergency Locator Transmitters, DO-183.
10. Federal Aviation Regulations, Section 91.207, Emergency Locator Transmitters.
Available HTTP:
http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgFAR.nsf/0/0CA5CO
070BD29144862569CF005F1030?OpenDocument
11. Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Bizjets lose ELT Exemption on Jan. 1,
Available HTTP: http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2003/03-4-154x.html
12. Rudawitz, Major David A., "ELT DF Training." [Online Power Point Presentation],
Available HTTP: www.cawg.cap.gov/html/Operations/other/ELTDFTraining.ppt
13. Mehta, Ajay, "COSPAS-SARSAT Overview." [Power Point Presentation], April 06,
1999.
14. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Aircraft Certification
Service, Technical Standard Order, TSO-C91 a Emergency Locator Transmitters
(ELT) Equipment, April 29, 1985.
15. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Aircraft Certification
Service, Technical Standard Order, TSO-C126 406 MHz Emergency Locator
Transmitters (ELT), December 23, 1992.
16. "Comparison of the 406 MHz and 121.5 MHz Distress Beacons", [Online Document],
Available at HTTP: www.sarsat.noaa.gov/406vs 121.pdf
17. "SARSAT Program Plan", [Online Document], June 30, 2000, Available at HTTP:
www.sarsat.noaa.gov/program-pln.pdf
18. "Introduction to COSPAS-SARSAT System" [Online Serial] 5 (1), (1990 October)
Available at HTTP: www.cospas-sarsat.com/DocumentsGSeries/g3oct29.pdf
19. "Current Space Segment Status", [Online Document], (September 2004) Available at
HTTP: www.cospas-sarsat.com/Status/spaceSegmentStatus.htm
20. "COSPAS-SARSAT System Data", [Online Document], (September 2004) Available
at HTTP: http://www.cospas-sarsat.org/DocumentsSystemDataDocument/SD30-
NOV04.pdf
21. "COSPAS-SARSAT Phase-Out Plan for 121.5/243 MHz Satellite Alerting Services"
[Online Serial] 1 (3), (2004 October) Available HTTP: http://www.cospas-
sarsat.org/DocumentsRSeries/R100ct04.pdf
22. "Issue Brief: Emergency Locator Transmitters", [Online Document] (April 2000)
Available at HTTP: www.aopa.org/whatsnew/la-elt.html
23. "COSPAS SARSAT Information Bulletin No. 16", COSPAS-SARSAT, August 2003.
24. "AFRCC Annual Reports: 1999 - 2003", [Online Documents], Available at HTTP:
www2.acc.af.mil/afrcc/annual%20 reportsl.htm
25. "FREDF Search Reports: 1997 - 2003", [Online Document], Available at HTTP:
www.fredf.org/rptslink.htm
26. Carden, Huey D., "Evaluation of Emergency-Locator-Transmitter Performance in
Real and Simulated Crash Tests", NASA TM-81960, 1981.
27. Gabler, H.C., Browning, D., and Schmalzel, J., "Development of an Enhanced
Emergency Locator Transmitter for General Aviation", Proceedings of the 2003 SAE
World Aviation Congress, Paper No. 2003-01-3010, Montreal, Canada (September
2003)
28. Personal Communication with Mr. Joe Blasenstein, Director of the MCCC Flight
School
29. "Engineering Data Sheet: Energizer No. EN95", [Online Document], Available at
HTTP: data.energizer.com/PDFs/EN95.pdf
30. Nahum, Alan M., Melvin, John W., Accidental injury: Biomechanics and Prevention,
Springer-Verlag New York, LCC, November 2001.
31. Mancini, Ron, "Op amps for Everyone", [Online Document], Available HTTP:
http://focus.ti.com/lit/an/slod006b/slod006b.pdf
32. Abramowitz, A., Ingraham, P. A., and McGuire, R., "Vertical Drop Test of a Shorts
3-30 Airplane", U.S. Department of Transportation, FAA, DOT/FAA/AR-99/87,
November 1999.
33. Wilson, Jon, "A Practical Approacth to Vibration Detection and Measurment",
[Online Document] Available HTTP:
http://www.sensorsmag.com/articles/0299/prac0299/main.shtml
34. Phillips, James R., "Piezoelectric Technology Primer", [Online Document] Available
HTTP: http://www.ctscorp.com/techpapers/piezotechprimer.pdf
35. PCB Piezotronics, "Introduction to Piezoelectric Accelerometers" [Online Document]
Available HTTP: http://www.pcb.com/techsupport/tech_accel.php
36. PCB Piezotronics, "General Piezoelectric Theory", [Online Document] Available
HTTP: http://www.pcb.com/techsupport/tech_gen.php
Appendix A - Onboard DAQ Validation
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Figure 54. Validation Test 2, Z Direction
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Figure 56. Validation Test 3, Y Direction
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Figure 57. Validation Test 3, Z Direction
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Figure 58. Validation Test 4, X Direction
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Figure 59. Validation Test 4, Y Direction
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Figure 60. Validation Test 4, Z Direction
Appendix B - Onboard DAQ Manual Trigger Data
September 13, 2004: 10:03:23 (30Hz LP Filtered, Biased Removed)
DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine off
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September 13, 2004: 10:03:37 (30Hz LP Filter, Biased Removed)
DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine off
- Z Data (Fitered)
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Time (s)
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September 13, 2004: 10:38:49 (30Hz LP Filter, Biased Removed)
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September 13, 2004: 10:44:34 (30Hz LP Filter, Biased Removed)
DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine on, Take-off
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September 13, 2004: 10:45:03 (30Hz LP Filter, Biased Removed)
DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine on, Flight
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September 13, 2004: 10:47:22 (30Hz LP Filter, Biased Removed)
DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine on, Flight
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September 13, 2004: 10:59:18 (30Hz LP Filter, Biased Removed)
DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine on, Landing
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September 13, 2004: 11:02:01 (30Hz LP Filter, Biased Removed)
DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine on, Flight
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September 13, 2004: 11:03:20 (30Hz LP Filter, Biased Removed)
DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine on, Landing
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September 13, 2004: 11:07:27 (30Hz LP Filter, Biased Removed)
DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine on, Landing
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September 13, 2004: 11:11:37 (30Hz LP Filter, Biased Removed)
DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine on, Landing
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DAQ installed in Cessna 152, Engine on, Landing
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Appendix C - Evaluation of the E2LT under Crash Loading
Introduction
The purpose of evaluating the E2LT under crash loading was to determine the
crash survivability of the E2LT and to ensure that the E2LT operated as designed in a
crash. These initial tests used a simple crash algorithm as described below. Having
shown proper operation of the E2LT, later chapters of this thesis will focus on
investigating the sensitivity of ELTs to non-distress events.
The crash survivability of the E2LT will be met if all the components of the E2LT
remain operational and undamaged after impact. The successful operation of the E2LT
will be met if the E2LT:
* Detects the crash
* Records the crash pulse
* Detects the GPS coordinates, if available
* Transmits to the base station.
The ideal method of testing the E2LT is during a full aircraft crashworthiness test.
FAA granted permission to 'piggy-back' the E2LT on to an FAA drop test, conducted in
July 2003 at the William J. Hughes Technical Center. Our approach was to conduct
component testing using the Crash Data Recorder (CDR) at the Rowan Drop Tower, and
then test the E2LT and CDR in the FAA full aircraft drop test. The CDR is a version of
the E2LT without the wireless modem and GPS receiver.
Component Testing
The goal was to compare the vertical and lateral acceleration pulses recorded by
the CDR in a drop test to vertical and lateral acceleration pulses obtained by a high
precision data acquisition system. Because the CDR and E2LT share the same sensor and
micro controller, tests of the CDR validate the sensor technology, crash detection, and
logging abilities of the E2LT. As the component tests were conducted indoors, the CDR
instead of the E2LT was used to avoid problems with the GPS and wireless reception.
Experimental Setup
The CDR uses an ADXL-250 accelerometer. This is a low-cost MEMs
accelerometer produced by Analog Devices, Inc. The ADXL-250 will be tested
alongside an Endevco 2262A-200 Piezoresistive accelerometer. The ADXL-250 has a
full-scale range of 50 Gs and a frequency response of 0 Hertz to 1000 Hertz within -3
Decibels (dB). The 2262A-200 can measure accelerations of 200 Gs with a frequency
response of 0 to 1800 Hz within ± 1dB. The Endevco accelerometer can measure higher
accelerations over a greater frequency band with greater precision.
A National Instruments (NI) SCXI data acquisition system controlled by LabView
was used to condition and record the signal of the precision accelerometers. The DAQ
board used was a NI AT-MIO-16E-1 capable of sampling at a rate of 1.25MS/s with a
12-bit DAC. This was connected to an SCXI-1000 Chassis with SCXI-1520 strain gauge
modules and SCXI-1314 terminal blocks. The accelerometers are strain gauge based
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Endevco 2262A instruments. A simple LabView program was created to record the
signals. Each accelerometer was given an excitation voltage of 10 Volts and was pre-
filtered at 1000 Hz. The sampling rate per channel was set to 2000 samples/second.
The CDR was programmed to record data if two consecutive samples were above
2.675 volts, which corresponds to 5 Gs. The CDR enclosure was not filled with
electronic potting since the micro controller would need to be removed and
reprogrammed for the FAA drop test. The y-axis of the ADXL-250 was aligned to record
vertical acceleration. The x-axis was oriented to measure lateral acceleration. The
experimental s etup w as installed in a v ertical drop tower, released from a h eight o f 8
inches, and impacted onto a fiber reinforced concrete platform.
Results
Results from the testing can be seen below in Figure 61 and Figure 62.
Time [sec]
Figure 61. Vertical Acceleration Results: CDR vs. Endevco Accelerometer
Time [sec]
Figure 62. Lateral Acceleration Results: CDR vs. Endevco Accelerometer
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Figure 61 and Figure 62 plot acceleration in Gs verses time in seconds. There are
two characteristics of the crash pulses that are of interest: magnitude and pulse duration.
The CDR acceleration pulses match the Endevco accelerometer results for each axis in
both magnitude and pulse duration. Table 14 summaries the results. The pulse width for
the CDR is shorter because it was not configured to record pre-trigger data. This test
proves that an ADXL-250 can record acceleration as accurately as a precision
accelerometer within the acceleration range expected in the FAA drop test. The cost of
an ADXL-250 was less than one tenth the cost of laboratory grade accelerometers.
Table 14. Summary EELT Validation Tests
Endevco CDR
X - Peak Gs 0.925 1.072
Y- Peak Gs 9.788 10.072
X - Delta T (ms) 93 72
Y - Delta T (ms) 83 67
FAA Dynamic Vertical Drop Test
Description of FAA Test
The FAA Crashworthiness Research Program has a Dynamic Vertical Drop Test
Facility at the William J. Hughes Technical Center in Pomona, NJ. Approximately every
other year, they perform a full-scale drop test to obtain data on the impact response
characteristics of aircraft components and the potential for occupant injury.
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The FAA Dynamic Vertical Drop Test Facility is a 50 ft. vertical steel structure
with an electrically powered winch to lift, lower, and drop an aircraft. A picture of an
ATR42-300 regional transport airplane and drop tower can be seen in Figure 63. The
airplane is hoisted to the desired height and allowed to drop in free fall. The FAA facility
can only provide vertical loading. No longitudinal loading is possible with this facility.
Figure 63. FAA Drop Tower and ATR42-300
The test of the ATR42-300 was conducted on July 30, 2003. The drop height was 14 ft,
for an impact velocity of 3 0 feet p er se cond. T he w eight o ft he airplane w as 3 3,200
pounds. The acceleration pulse was expected to peak between 15 and 20 Gs.
Experimental Setup
The mounting location for the E2LT and CDR was a structural ring located near
the entrance panel of the tail compartment. Pictures of the tail compartment can be seen
in Figure 64 and Figure 65. A mounting bracket was designed to grip around the I-beam
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like profile of this ring. The CDR and E2LT were then mounted to this bracket as seen in
Figure 67. The antennas were mounted to the rear of the tail, as seen in Figure 66.
Figure 64. Tail Compartment, Front Wall
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Figure 65. Tail Compartment, Rear Wall
A mobile Base Station was developed to listen for the E2 LT distress call. The
mobile Base Station consisted of a Dell Inspiron 8200 Laptop and a Kyocera 2235
cellular phone. The CDPD modem in the E2LT had a dedicated IP address. The cellular
phone account was upgraded to include Internet access so a communication link could be
established between the mobile Base Station and E2LT.
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Figure 66. Antenna Mounting Locations
When a crash is sensed, the E2 LT is designed to 'wake-up' the wireless modem,
call-up a preprogrammed static IP address, and transmit data. Unfortunately, it was not
possible to setup the mobile Base Station with a static IP address. To compensate for
this, the E2 LT was programmed to 'wake-up' the wireless modem, wait for a crash, and
then transmit data when a crash is detected. The communication link had to be initiated
by the mobile Base Station. The mobile Base Station then listened for the E2 LT to detect
a crash.
The acceleration levels of the ATR42-300 at the end of lifting could be in excess
of 10 Gs owing to the abrupt halt of the aircraft. This could cause a false trigger of the
E2LT. The peak acceleration expected during the ATR42-300 drop test would be
approximately 15 Gs. The trigger level for the E2 LT was set to 12 Gs, which is much
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greater than the normal 'wake up' threshold, to avoid a false trigger but still detect a
crash.
On the day prior to the test, the CDR was filled with re-entrant electronic potting
prior to installation. Once installed, it was noticed that the CDR LED indicator light was
not operational, and a decision was made not to fill the E2LT with potting. The E2LT was
installed as seen in Figure 67. The FAA also installed two accelerometers on the E2 LT
mounting brace. Diagnostic tests were performed on the CDR. The CDR was found to be
non-operational and was removed from the aircraft. On the day of the test the mobile
Base Station was also setup and the E2LT was armed. A wireless link was formed
between the E2LT and mobile Base Station prior to the lifting of the aircraft.
Figure 67. Installation of E2LT
FAA Results
Figure 68 and Figure 69 show the ATR42-300 elevated and then after impact.
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Figure 68. ATR42-300 Elevated for Drop Test
Figure 69. ATR42-300 Impact
As shown in Figure 65 and Figure 67 there were three FAA accelerometers
mounted in the tail compartment. Two of these accelerometers were oriented in the
vertical direction, while one was aligned with the longitudinal axis of the ATR42-300.
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The longitudinal accelerometer did not record useful data and the measurements were
discarded. Figure 70 and Figure 71 are plots of the FAA deceleration data from the
accelerometers mounted on the E2LT bracket (Figure 67) and mounted on the rear wall of
the aircraft (Figure 65); respectively. These signals were sampled at 10 kHz, and post-
filtered with a 100 Hz Butterworth filter.
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Figure 70. ATR42-300 Drop Test C302 - Channel 302 Z-Dir Acceleration
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Figure 71. ATR42-300 Drop Test: Channel 18, Z-Dir Acceleration
Figure 70 and Figure 71 also have a line at 12 Gs that represents the threshold set in the
E2LT.
E2LT Results
Upon impact, the E2LT successfully detected the crash and transmitted the
coordinates o fthe c rash s ite. T he mobile b ase station received a transmission for the
E2LT with a notification of the crash, along with streaming GPS coordinates. The GPS
data was transmitted in National Marine Electronic Association (NMEA) format.
Decoding the GPS position revealed the crash was at 39 degrees 26.1182 minutes North
latitude and 074 Degrees 33.3957 minutes West longitude. Using Microsoft Streets &
Trips, the position was imported and the map is shown in Figure 72.
^r
Figure 72. E LT Recorded Crash Location
The map shows that the crash occurred at the FAA Dynamic Vertical Drop Test
Facility. The E2 LT is designed to record the output voltage of the ADXL250, convert
that into 10-bit representation, and store it on onboard non-volatile memory. The
acceleration pulse retrieved from the E2 LT did not exceed the 12 G trigger threshold, and
therefore cannot be the crash pulse from the ATR42-300 drop test. The E2 LT incorrectly
stored the crash pulse to memory or an existing crash pulse what was not overwritten.
Conclusion
This experiment was used to test the E2LT's crash survivability and test how well
the E 2LT operates under c rash c onditions. T he E 2LT survived t he c rash, and m et t he
following objectives:
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* Detected crash
* Established the crash location via GPS
* Transmitted to base station.
The E2LT only failed at recording the crash pulse, which was accomplished by the
CDR during component testing. The reason for this failure is not yet known, but is
thought to be a software malfunction.
The CDR, the component of the E2LT that is responsible for detecting and
recording crashes, was fully-functional before an electronic potting was used. Failure of
the CDR is suspected to be the result of the potting breaking the connection of a socket
IC as it cured. In future design revisions, a socket connection will not be used.
Overall, the E2LT completed the most important task, which was transmitting a
distress call in the event of a crash. GPS coordinates were also successfully transmitted
which is invaluable in SAR operations. The location of the E2LT was received by the
mobile base station within seconds of the impact, and represented a significant
improvement over TSO-C91 (a) ELT; the most-common ELT installed in general
aviation aircraft.
Appendix D - Reverse Engineering of a 406MHz ELT
Rowan University purchased an Artex G406-4 ELT that was disassembled to
determine the crash sensor technology. The G406-4 is a TSO-C126 certified automatic
fixed (AF) ELT that transmits on carrier frequencies of 121.5 MHz, 243 MHz, and 406
MHz. Figure 73 shows the G406-4 viewed from the front cover (left photo) and viewed
from the battery pack cover (right photo). A label on the front cover displays the model
information, basic operation instructions, and a 15 digit Hex ID. Labels on the battery
pack cover display the type of batteries, the battery pack model number, and battery pack
expiration date.
Figure 73. Artex G406-4 Emergency Locator Transmitter, Exterior Views
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The forward face of the G406-4 ELT, Figure 74, includes an ON/OFF switch, a
12-pin connector, a BNC connector, and a TPS connector. The ON/OFF switch controls
the manual activation of the ELT. When the switch is in the ON position, the G406-4
will transmit a distress call. When the switch is in the OFF position, the G406-4 is armed
and will transmit a distress call in the event of a crash. The 12-pin connector is to be
wired to a remote panel installed in the cockpit on an aircraft. This external interface is
necessary for TSO-C126 approved installations. The remote panel contains a light to
notify the pilot when the ELT is activated, allows the pilot to reset the ELT in case of a
false alarm, and manually activate the ELT in case of an emergency. The BNC and TPS
connectors attach to a 121.5/243 MHz antenna and a 406 MHz antenna respectively.
Figure 74. Forward Face of a G406-4 ELT
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The G406-4 is shipped from Artex armed and with a battery pack installed. To
prevent false activation during shipping the G-switch is disabled. To enable the G-switch
of the G406-4, a jumper must be placed between pin five (5) and pin eight (8) of the 12-
pin connector. An optional ELT to NAV interface can also be connected to the G406-4.
This interface connects the ELT to the aircraft Flight Management System (FMS) or GPS
receiver. When the G406-4 is connected to the ELT to NAV interface, the G406-4 will
transmit positional data (latitude and longitude) in its digital message.
The Printed Circuit Assembly (PCA) and G-switch can be seen when the front
cover of the G406-4 is removed, Figure 75. The PCA controls manual and automatic
activation of the ELT, modulation, digital message content for the 406 MHz signal, and
resetting the ELT. The G-switch was manufactured by Select Controls Inc and was cut
open to reveal a mass-spring system, Figure 76. The G-switch is normally open, but will
close when a deceleration threshold of 2.0+.1G and velocity change of -4.5fps +-0.5 fps
is experienced. These specifications for automatic activation are from JTSO-2C126. The
FAA has approved of these crash activation requirements and has certified the G406-4
ELT as TSO-C126 compliant.
Figure 75. G406-4 ELT with Front Cover Removed
133
Figure 76. Cut-Away of a G406-4 G-Switch
Figure 77 shows the battery pack removed. Also removed was a cover
underneath which was the Radio Frequency (RF) module. The battery pack contains four
(4) D-Cell Lithium Manganese Dioxide batteries, four (4) diodes, a fuse, and circuit
board. The diodes and fuse are a safety feature to prevent charging of the batteries. The
circuit board contains EPROM memory and it monitors battery life by performing two
operations. The first operation is to count and store the number of ELT activations. The
second operation is to time and store the duration of the ELT activations. If the ELT is
activated for one (1) hour or more, the battery pack must be replaced. When the G406-4
is activated, the RF module will continuously transmit a 121.5/243 MHz signal and
intermittently transmit a high-power 406 MHz digital message every fifty (50) seconds.
134
Figure 77. G4U0-4 ELT with Battery rack Removed
The RF module, Figure 78, is a dual output transmitter manufactured by Thales
Microelectronics. One output is for the 121.5/243 MHz signal and the second output is
for 406 MHz signal. The RF module contains stable electronics to ensure that the 406
MHz signal will not deviate more than ± 0.001 percent within five (5) years. The 121.5
MHz and 243 MHz signal will not deviate more than ± 0.005 percent. A 15-pin
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connector connects the RF module to the PCA. The RF Module has been shielded to
prevent electromagnetic interference.
G406-4 RF Module
A TSO-C91 (a) ELT was disassembled and it was compared against the G604-4.
The TSO-C91(a) ELT was an ACK Technologies E-01 automatic portable (AP) ELT.
Figure 79 shows the E-01 assembled, and Figure 80 shows all for internal components of
the E-01 minus eight (8) D-Cell alkaline batteries. It is clearly seen that a TSO-126 ELT
has a more complex design than a TSO-C91(a) ELT except for one aspect - the crash
sensing technology. A cut-away of the G-switch found in the E-01 can be seen in Figure
81. Both the G406-4 and E-01 use a mass-spring system to determine whether a crash
has occurred.
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Figure 79. ACK Technologies E-01 Emergency Locator Transmitter
Figure 80. Internal components of E-01 ELT
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Figure 81. Cut-away of E-01 G-switch
Table 15 shows some components of the G406-4 ELT and associated retail price.
The most expensive item is the dual output RF module. This is primary reason why
current 406 MHz emergency beacons cost notably more than 121.5/243 MHz emergency
beacons.
Table 15. G406-4 Components
Part Number Description Price
345-5001 Printed Circuit Assembly (PCA) $124.00
452-0222 Lithium battery pack $ 309.00
452-0220 Dual output RF module $ 890.30
2014-2-000 G-Switch $ 50.00
Total: $1,373.30
Both of the G406-4 and E-01 were designed for use with general aviation aircraft.
Other models of Artex ELTs are designed for operation with larger commercial and
private aircraft. The C406-2 is almost identical to the G406-4 except it requires different
antennas rated for higher speeds. The C406N has a built-in ELT to NAV interface.
Table 16 shows the cost of Artex products and of the E-01. It is easily seen that TSO-
C126 ELTs cost substantial more that TSO-C91 (a) ELTs. The reason being that price of
138
high-speed antennas or an ELT to NAV interface exceeds $1000.00. Artex has
developed the ME406, a low-cost TSO-C126 ELT for general aviation aircraft. The
ME406 is expected to be available June 2005 and reduces the cost of a TSO-C126 ELT
by forty (40) percent.
Table 16. Comparison of ELT Prices
Manufacturer Description Price
Artex G406-4 ELT (with all necessary accessories $1,739.00
Artex C406-2 ELT (with all necessary accessories) $3,669.00
Artex C406N ELT (with all necessary accessories) $5,239.00
Artex ELT to NAV interface $1,358.50
ACK E-01 (with all necessary accessories) $ 219.00
Artex ME406 ELT (with all necessary accessories) $1,089.00
